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The time honored axiom of the common law tradition is that a
court must exercise the jurisdiction that it possesses.1 Chief Justice
Marshall declared that judicial conduct contrary to this principle
would be in direct defiance of the prerogatives set forth in the
Constitution. Marshall opined, "[we] have no more right to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. 2
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1. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1971) citing Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). See also Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534
(1893) (stating that ."the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to
afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They
cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction."') (citations
omitted); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (observing that "[w]hen a
federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty
to take such jurisdiction .... The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there
is a choice cannot be properly denied.") (citations omitted). McLellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268,
282 (1910) (concluding that federal courts have "not authority" to abdicate jurisdiction because
of pending state proceeding).
2. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
observed:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the
constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts,
with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought
before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to
the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot
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"Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal
jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds."3
At the core of this belief is that where federal jurisdictional
requirements have been legally met, an exercise of judicial discretion
to abstain constitutes a judicial usurpation of legislative power. One
leading commentator has articulated the view that abstention is
anathema to the doctrine of separation of powers:
If Congress intended that the federal courts exercise a particular
jurisdiction, either to achieve substantive legislative ends or to
provide a constitutionally-contemplated jurisdictional
advantage, a court may not, absent constitutional objections,
repeal those jurisdictional grants. Though one may question
why, if the courts do not possess the institutional authority to
repeal the legislature's jurisdictional scheme, they possess any
greater authority to modify the scheme in a manner not
contemplated by the legislative body. In either repealing or
modifying the legislation, the court would be altering a
legislative scheme because of disagreement with the social policy
choices that the scheme manifests. Thus, if a judge-made form
of partial abstention is inconsistent with Congressional intent to
leave federal court jurisdiction unlimited, the fact that the
abstention leaves in tact a portion of the jurisdictional grant will
not insulate it from a separation of powers attack.
The foundation of the separation of powers critique is the
assumption that judge-made partial abstention conflicts with
avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to
perform our duty.
Id. Justice Marshall's comments have found resonance with the court. See, e.g., Justice
Brennan's warning in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., 460
U.S. 1, 15 (1983) where he stated that the Federal Courts have a "virtually unflagging
obligation.., to exercise the jurisdiction given them." This belief has been expressed through
leading scholarly publications. See, e.g., Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and
the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 112 (1984) (". . . vesting a power in the
federal courts to adjudicate the relevant claims without a corresponding duty to do so is
unacceptable."). See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543 (1985); Michael M. Wilson, Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to
Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 641, 641-
42 (1977) (observing that the right to a federal forum is secured by the Constitution); Note,
Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE
L.J. 978, 980 (1950) (same); Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently
Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 687 (1960) (the right to a federal forum is
secured by the Constitution and supportive judicial precedent). Barry Friedman, A Revisionist
Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989); Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far,
Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99 (1986).
3. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359
(1989) citing Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
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congressional goals embodied in the seemingly unlimited grants
of jurisdiction. It is the validity of this assumption that arguably
separates the total and partial abstention models as departures
from separation of powers principles. Various models of implied
congressional authorization may be employed to justified partial
abstention, but they are incapable of supporting total abstention.
While it is at least conceivable that Congress would implicitly
delegate to the judiciary the authority to modify or limit a
substantive statutory right or a jurisdictional grant, it is absurd
to imagine that Congress would implicitly grant the courts
authority effectively to repeal such legislation. The exercise of
such authority would render pointless the entire legislative
process.
The fact that Congress theoretically could delegate to the court
the power to modify otherwise unlimited legislation, however,
does not mean that Congress has actually done so. It is this
improper leap from theoretical possibilities to assumed fact that
ultimately undermines any defense of the partial abstention
model from a separation-of-powers attack.4
The interrelationship between legislative mandates establishing
the jurisdictional boundaries of the courts and court invocation of that
jurisdiction is significant. Democratic societies rely upon majoritarian
self-determination. "American Constitutional democracy vests in a
largely unrepresentative judiciary the power to invalidate laws adopted
by a majoritarian legislature when those laws are deemed to violate
constitutional protections. ' For American Constitutional democracy
to function properly, the courts must act within their congressionally-
conferred jurisdictional province.' However, invocation of jurisdiction
4. Redish, supra note 2, at 77-79. Some commentators have argued for the expansion of
federal judicial power for two principle reasons: (1) fear of perceived local prejudices, and (2) fear
that a local forum will ignore or disregard federal law. David J. McCarthy, Note, Preclusion
Concerns as an Additional Factor When Staying a Federal Suit in Deference to a Concurrent State
Proceeding, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1985). See also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts
and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (federal
courts are the preferred forum for determination and analysis of constitutional principles); David
A. Sonenshin, Abstention: The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TULANE L. REV. 651 (1985)
(because federal judges have life tenure, they are less subject to the vagaries and pressures of local
public opinion, Congress has preserved the federal forum to litigants.).
5. Redish, supra note 2, at 77.
6. In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) the court observed:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each branch having
certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is," . . . it is equally-and emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not
only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to
establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress, exercising its
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by the federal courts has proved to be an elastic practice that has
expanded and contracted with little jurisprudential consistency. This
elasticity has been permitted by another axiom of the common law
tradition, "abstention." While one axiom stands for the proposition
that jurisdiction should be always be exercised, the other declares that
there are circumstances where the former proposition does not hold
up.
7
Procedurally, federal courts can indirectly abstain from
exercising jurisdiction without reliance on the abstention doctrine.
This can be accomplished under the concept of justiciability,8 or
through the doctrines of ripeness,9  forum non conveniens, °  or
exhaustion of remedies." Even the United States Supreme Court has
delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the
Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement
is sought.
Id. at 194 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See also California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981) and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
576 (1979).
7. New Orleans Public Service, 491 U.S. at 359 (1989) (stating that the axiom of exercising
conferred jurisdiction "does not eliminate, however, and the categorical assertions based upon it
do not call into question, the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant certain
types of relief-a discretion that was part of the common-law background against which the
statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted."). See also Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S.,
Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422 (1932) (observing that "the proposition that a court having jurisdiction
must exercise it, is not universally true.").
8. Under the concept of justiciability the court can indirectly abstain. The doctrine of
standing and the doctrine of mootness may ultimately determine whether the federal court will
abstain. The Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine of standing has both a
constitutional and a prudential aspect. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975)
(court addressed the prudential limitations that were "closely related to Article II concerns but
essentially matters of judicial self governance"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
804 (1985) (recognizing the prudential limitation that a "litigant must normally assert his own
legal interest rather than those of third parties"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1996)
(recognizing prudential objectives served by jus tertii limitations on standing).
9. The doctrine of ripeness has a large discretionary element associated with it. Compare
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) with Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) and it is not
easy to discern whether a particular result rests upon the court's view of constitutional necessity
or on prudential choice. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947)
(challenges to the Hatch Act unright with the intimation that the result was constitutionally
mandated). Mootness is a deliberately open ended concept of justiciability where, as an example,
in an action for equitable relief the reasonable expectation of repetition cannot render the matter
moot despite a defendant's voluntary discontinuance of a challenged practice. See, e.g., United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-36 (1953).
10. Another aspect of indirect abstention comes in the form of forum non conveniens. As an
example, Justice Jackson in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) noted that "the
principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."
11. Abstention may take the form of an implicit exhaustion of remedies. The plaintiff may
be required to exhaust alternative routes of relief before seeking a federal forum. As an example,
"[a] refusal to enjoin a state criminal proceeding is, in effect, a holding that a federal court will
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discretion to indirectly abstain from the exercise of its jurisdiction. 12
However, the judicially created "abstention doctrine," in its various
forms, has given even wider berth to the federal courts through which
they may abstain from exercising their jurisdiction.
consider the federal claim only on direct review or on habeas corpus, after the state proceeding
has come to an end. Pullman abstention represents a "decision that a federal court will not
consider the constitutionality of a state statute until the plaintiff has sought a clarification of state
law.., from a state court." Shapiro, supra note 2, at 558. For example, in Ex Parte Royal, 117
U.S. 241 (1886), a prisoner, about ready to be tried in a state court, sought federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that the state statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 245. In the opinion,
Justice Harlan, observed that the federal court had jurisdiction over the case and that in special
circumstances it might be appropriate for a court to grant relief before the conclusion of the state
proceedings. Id. at 245-50. However, the court held that the state court should typically be
permitted to proceed without federal interference so long as the state court was competent to
consider the federal claim involved. Id. at 251.
12. The U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction contains significant elements of
discretion. See, e.g., Richard F. Wolfson, Extraordinary Writs In The Supreme Courts Since Ex
Parte Peru, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 977, 991 (1951). The Court has obvious discretion regarding
certiorari jurisdiction which has been made discretionary by specific legislative delegation. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 1257(3) (1982). This discretion is limited by self-imposed guidelines
which the court chooses to impose upon itself. Commentators have discussed the formulation of
potential criteria for the exercise of this jurisdiction. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & John E.
Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Imperial Study, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (1984) (attempting to formulate such criteria). See generally, Peter Linzer,
The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1229-44 (1979). Although
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions raising federal questions is generally considered
"obligatory" the determination of the substantiality of the particular federal question presented
acts as a judicial prerequisite. If the question is not sufficiently substantial to warrant either
plenary review or a summary determination on the merits the appeal may be dismissed.
Commentators have observed:
Plainly, the criterion of substantiality is neither rigid nor narrow. The play of
discretion is inevitable .... To the extent that there are reasonable differences of
opinion as to the solidity of a question presented for decision [the administration of
the rule for appeals] operates to subject the obligatory jurisdiction of the court to
discretionary considerations not unlike those governing certiorari.
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business Of The Supreme Court At October Term,
1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1930). Professor Bickle in his essays on the federal judiciary
delineated the clear distinction between the functions of the Supreme Court and of the lower
federal courts. It was his position that the lower courts, being the primary agencies for the
settlement of disputes, are bound by the axiom set forth by Marshall. In other words, they must
"resolve all controversies within their jurisdiction, because the alternative is chaos." See
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 173
(1962). See also Shapiro, supra note 2, at 577.
Another area of jurisdictional discretion for the U.S. Supreme Court revolves around its
statutory authority to consider, upon certification by a Federal Court of Appeals, "any question
of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired." 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2)
(1982). The Court has assumed the power to refuse to answer a certified question
notwithstanding the fact that the statute does not explicitly advise the Court's authority is
discretionary. See, e.g., NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23, 27 (1941) (dismissing the
question certified as "hypothetical and abstract"). If a question is not thought to be worthy of
the Court's time, the Court will not answer the certified question. See, e.g., Wisniewski v.
United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957) (per curium).
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Originally, the doctrine of abstention was relegated to only those
cases which arose in equity. 3 The doctrine has since expanded
beyond equity application so that abstention is now applied to "all
cases in which a federal court is asked to provide some form of
discretionary relief."' 4 Certainly, most federal judges in the present
day would not consider the exercise of any of the various forms of
abstention as an act of "treason." Instead, for many, using the guise of
preserving federalism, this is simply a means of reducing part of the
burden of the federal docket. The debate has long been raging over
the elimination of areas of the federal courts' jurisdiction, with specific
emphasis on diversity jurisdiction in general; however, because
Congress has failed to address these issues, the courts have felt
compelled to exercise judicial power to accomplish what Congress
would not. 5
The practical question that is of primary importance is just how
far the federal courts are going to stray from the axiom of exercising
jurisdiction in order to accomplish the goal of lightening their load.
Further, it must be determined whether the courts are acting
consistent with their Constitutional authority in their use of the
abstention doctrine or whether it has simply become a matter of the
ends justifying the means.' 6
This article focuses upon abstention in the context of the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act ("FDJA").Y Congress enacted the FDJA
in 1934, thereby authorizing federal courts to grant federal declaratory
judgment relief.'8 The FDJA provides in relevant part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.., any
court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
13. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 717. The Quackenbush court stated that "it has long been
established that a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it 'is
asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity."' Id. (quoting Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
14. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730 (citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319
U.S. 293, 297 (1943); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-70, 72-73 (1971)).
15. Redish, supra note 2, at 112-15.
16. One commentator has observed:
Presumably no one would deny that a federal court cannot legitimately invalidate a
federal statute solely because of its unwise policies, or because it would make judges
work harder than they believe they should, or because the judges themselves would
not have enacted such legislation. Such behavior by the judiciary would amount to
blatant-and indefensible-usurpation of legislative authority. At most, the judiciary
possesses authority to overturn federal legislation because it is unconstitutional, not
because the judiciary considers it unwise. Yet, in a sense, the abstention doctrines
amount to such usurpation.
Redish, supra note 2, at 72 (citations omitted).




pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking declaration, whether or not further relief
is or could be sought.. Any such declaration shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable
as such. 19
Federal jurisdiction under the FDJA is based solely upon the
original jurisdiction of the court; namely, diversity jurisdiction or
federal question jurisdiction."g While district courts have discretion to
exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions brought under
the FDJA, that discretion is not unfettered.2' A district court cannot
decline to entertain a declaratory judgment action as a matter of whim
or personal disinclination.22 The discretion granted by the FDJA
essentially builds the abstention doctrine into the grant of
jurisdiction.23
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Huth v. Hartford Insurance
Company of the Midwest,24 the court greatly expanded the abstention
doctrine within the Ninth Circuit, both in relation to the FDJA and to
declaratory judgment actions generally. Under this expanded
application, courts can free the federal docket of declaratory judgment
actions with unfettered discretion, in contravention to federal
precedent and the historical purpose of the abstention doctrine. The
question is whether the other circuit courts, experiencing similar
compressions within their dockets, will follow.
Part I will discuss the various forms of abstention and the
historical progression and development of the abstention doctrine in
federal case law, setting the background for the expansive holding in
Huth v. Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest. Part II of the
article will discuss the procedural history of Huth and the respective
rulings of the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as
it relates to their application of the abstention doctrine. Part III will
then analyze the numerous, and potentially detrimental, chilling
effects of this ruling and the extensive broadening of the abstention
doctrine as it applies to declaratory judgment actions, a development
that diverges from the bases and reasoning of the doctrine as it has
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995) ("Brillhart makes clear that
District Courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under
the [Federal] Declaratory Judgment Act").
22. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962)).
23. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282.
24. 298 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2002).
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been historically applied. Part IV will conclude the article,
summarizing the federal courts' use of this doctrine and how the Huth
decision is the next extensive progression in the unilateral narrowing
of the boundaries of jurisdiction undertaken by the federal judiciary.
I. THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE-
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
While the original power to abstain from exercising federal
jurisdiction arose out of the historical discretion of federal courts
sitting in equity,25 the doctrine remained largely undeveloped in the
United States until the early 1940s.26 The main purpose of the
abstention doctrine is to maintain a balance between state and federal
sovereignty, but commentators disagree on the proper scope of its
use.27 Supporters of abstention argue that abstention promotes a wiser
balance of judicial federalism.2" In contrast, some critics seek to show
the superiority of federal courts over state courts as enforcers of federal
rights.29
25. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) (observing that "it has
long been established that a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction
when it 'is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity."' (quoting Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
26. Redish, supra note 2, at 71 (stating that "[tihe federal courts have long assumed the
authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction explicitly vested in them by Congress. The courts
have also assumed that they may decline to enforce certain substantive federal rights, usually
those protecting individual civil liberties against state invasion. These presumptions of authority
are manifested in the various 'abstention' doctrines, developed by the federal courts largely
within the last fifty years.") (citations omitted).
27. For a brief comparison of abstention doctrine see Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 4241 (2d ed. 1988). In justifying federal abstention, the Supreme Court
has expressed concern for comity and federalism interests. The relationships between coordinate
state and federal judicial systems is often referred to as "comity." The relationships between
state and federal sovereigns is often referred to as federalism.
28. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial
Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1151 (1974) (abstention is the "highest form of cooperative
judicial federalism"); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 581 (observing that "even in a system that is
essentially unitary in character, experience counsels mutual respect among the arms of
government").
29. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977)
("the only judicial forums in our system capable of enforcing counter majoritarian checks in a
sustained, effective manner are the federal courts."). It has been argued:
[T]he courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning
than is the legislature. Moreover, questions of jurisdiction are of special concern to
the courts because they intimately affect the courts' relations with each other as well
as with the other branches of government. Therefore, the continued existence of
measured authority to decline jurisdiction does not endanger, but rather protects, the
principle of separation of powers.
Shapiro, supra note 2, at 574. However, this commentator also noted that "a wholesale refusal by
the federal courts to adjudicate diversity cases on the grounds that these courts have more
important things to do, and that the state courts are more appropriate tribunals, simply cannot be
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While the many variations on the abstention theme" overlap to
differing degrees, there are several well-known and established classes
or categories of abstention." The principle variants are: Pullman,
32
Burford,33 and Younger34 abstention. These types of abstention "are
not rigid pigeon holes into which federal courts must try to fit cases.
Rather, they reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the
tensions inherent in a system that contemplates parallel judicial
processes."3"
A. Pullman Abstention-Allowing Resolution of Unsettled State Law
Questions
Pullman abstention,36 arising out of the Supreme Court's decision
in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company,37 applies to cases
presenting federal constitutional issues that have become moot or may
reconciled with the congressional grant of authority, no matter how much appeal this approach
may have for particular judges." Id. at 587 (citing Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 423
U.S. 336 (1976) (holding that a district court may not remand a case removed from state court on
diversity grounds when the sole reason for remanding was the district court's crowded docket)).
For an argument to reorient the abstention doctrines see James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity
Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 1049 (1994).
30. Many concepts can be labeled as part of the abstention doctrine. A case in point is
exemplified by so-called Rooker-Feldman abstention which originated from Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Under Rooker-Feldman abstention, the court recognizes that Congress has conferred original
jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction on the federal district courts. Rooker-Feldman
abstention prevents a state court party from having two bites at the apple: one through the state
courts with a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court and the other through a subsequent collateral
attack originating in the federal courts. Where a party begins litigating a constitutional matter in
state court and stops short of petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court, and then initiates litigation in
federal court regarding the same constitutional matter, the federal district court can abstain.
Rooker-Feldman abstention essentially holds that the federal district court does not have appellate
jurisdiction over the state court. The state court party should continue through the state court
proceeding up through the U.S. Supreme Court.
31. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987).
32. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
33. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
34. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
35. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987).
36. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997); Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9 (1983); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1979); Ohio
Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977); Harris County Comm'rs
Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975). Cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 n.1 (1993) (stating
that while the Pullman doctrine is referred to as a form of abstention, "[t]o bring out more
clearly, however, the distinction between those circumstances that require dismissal of a suit and
those that require postponing consideration of its merits, it would be preferable to speak of
Pullman 'deferral.' Pullman deferral recognizes that federal courts should not prematurely resolve
the constitutionality of a state statute ... .
37. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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be presented in a different posture as the result of a state court
determination of relevant state law involved in the case." s In other
words, "when a federal constitutional claim is premised on an
unsettled question of state law, the federal court should stay its hand
in order to provide the state courts an opportunity to settle the
underlying state-law question and thus avoid the possibility of
unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question.""
The Court's decision in Pullman, and the resultant doctrine of
Pullman abstention, is a reflection of constitutional avoidance, a
doctrinal goal traditionally embraced by the Supreme Court.4" To this
end, Pullman abstention attempts to avoid "'needless friction' between
federal pronouncements and state policies" and promotes the general
preservation of federalism.41
The exercise of Pullman abstention requires the presence of two
conjunctive42 elements or "special circumstances."43 First, there must
be an uncertain question of state law.44 Second, the unsettled question
38. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)
(quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)).
39. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285 (1979) (quoting Harris County Comm'rs Court v.
Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975)). See also Moore, 442 U.S. at 427-28 (stating "that a federal
action should be stayed pending determination in state court of state-law issues central to the
constitutional dispute."); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978); Hodory, 431 U.S. at 477
(stating that Pullman abstention "involves an inquiry focused on the possibility that the state
courts may interpret a challenged state statute so as to eliminate or at least to alter materially, the
constitutional question presented."); Boehning v. Indiana State Employees Assn., Inc., 423 U.S.
6 (1975); Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970);
Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964); Dresner v. Tallahassee, 378 U.S. 539 (1964); Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S.
639 (1959); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Railroad Comm'n
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
40. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930) (constitutional questions
will not be decided unnecessarily).
41. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970) (citing Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500).
42. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1964) (abstention not automatic
merely because doubtful issue of state law exists); Meredith v. City of Winterhaven, 320 U.S.
228, 234 (1943) (absent a potential limiting constitutional issue, abstention is inappropriate
because a challenged state law is difficult or uncertain).
43. See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234 (describing the two constituent elements as "exceptional
circumstances"). The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its determination of when the
special circumstances warranting Pullman Abstention are present. Compare Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (abstention inappropriate because no ambiguity existed
in state statute) with Reetz v. Pozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1970) (abstention appropriate
because it was "conceivable" that a state court would interpret the state statute at issue contrary
to its clear import, thus avoiding a constitutional question).
44. Federal courts should avoid making forecasts of state law. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499-
500. The Court in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) noted that Pullman Abstention was
generally appropriate only when state law issues are complex, unsettled, or unclear. Id. at 375
(citing Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949) (when federal court has been granted
jurisdiction, abstention should not impede normal course of action)). Under Baggett, the federal
2004] Expanding Judicial Abstention
of state law must be susceptible45 to a construction which will moot,
limit or change the way the federal court will view the federal
question." For abstention to be appropriate, a court must determine
when these two conjunctive elements are present on a case-by-case
basis.47 Because Pullman abstention is an equitable doctrine, it cannot
be reduced to a simple formula. 8
The Supreme Court expanded Pullman abstention in Government
and Civic Employees Organization Committee v. S. F. Windsor.49 The
ruling in Windsor attempted to clarify whether state or federal courts
were the appropriate forums to hear constitutional challenges to state
law.5° Windsor involved a federal suit to enjoin the enforcement of an
Alabama statute that denied employment benefits to public employees
who had joined labor unions.5 The Court abstained from reaching
the constitutional question by reasoning that the Alabama Supreme
Court "might have construed the statute in a different manner" if the
state court had been presented with the constitutional claim.52
Because the Alabama court did not have an opportunity to construe
courts pre-abstention analysis should take into consideration the nature of the unsettled question.
Id. at 376-77.
45. Similar inconsistencies in the court's articulation of whether an unsettled state law
question is subject to a limiting construction which is dispositive of the federal question. One
articulation requires a challenged statute to be "obviously susceptible to a limiting construction."
Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967) (where state statute not obviously susceptible of
a limiting construction, abstention is inappropriate). A different articulation focuses on whether
the state statute is "fairly" susceptible to such a construction. See, e.g., Harman v. Forsinius,
380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965) (where state statute not fairly susceptible to limiting construction,
abstention inappropriate). A third articulation finds abstention appropriate where it is
"conceivable" that the challenged state statute is amenable to a limiting construction. Fornaris v.
Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1970) (abstention appropriate where "conceivable" that
phrase in state statute amenable to limiting construction). The Court has suggested that these
articulations of susceptibility are interchangeable. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
46. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499-501; see also Harris County Comm'rs v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77,
84 (1975) (where resolution of unclear state law question would avoid or significantly modify the
federal constitutional question, abstention is appropriate); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54-
55 (1973) (same).
47. Baggett, 377 U.S. at 375.
48. See Gonzales v. Gonzales, 536 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1976); Ahrensfeld v. Stephens,
528 F.2d 193, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1975) (abstention is discretionary, judge made doctrine to be
applied on a case-by-case basis only where special circumstances apply); Muskegon Theaters,
Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d. 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1974) (abstention is equitable doctrine
turning on case-by-case facts).
49. 353 U.S. 364 (1974) (per curium)
50. Id. at 366.
51. Id. at 365.
52. Id. at 366. Certification of unsettled state law issues to the state's highest court may be
effective alternative to Pullman abstention. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976)
(certification saves time, energy and resources and aids in developing cooperative judicial
federalism).
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the statute in light of the constitutional claim, the Court in Windsor
concluded that an exercise of federal jurisdiction would result in an
insufficient bona fide interpretation of Alabama state law. 3
The Windsor court did not address the choice of forum issues
that arise when a particular case involves both state and federal claims.
In England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners,54 however, the
Court recognized that federal plaintiffs have a right to return to federal
court to have their federal claims heard after Pullman/Windsor
abstention. 5  Under England, a federal plaintiff is required to "inform
[the state court] what [the] federal claims are, so that the state statute
may be construed 'in light of those claims."' 56 The federal plaintiff
must (1) state for the record that the constitutional claims are exposed
in the state court proceedings; (2) solely for the purpose of resolving a
state statute in light of the constitutional issues; and (3) not litigate the
constitutional issues in state court because the plaintiff intends to
return to federal court.57  This procedure preserves the federal
plaintiffs right to a choice of forum for the constitutional claims. 8
53. 353 U.S. at 366.
54. 375 U.S. 411 (1960).
55. Id. at 417 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427 (1963) (party has right to return
to district court after obtaining state court construction from which federal court abstained)).
56. 375 U.S. at 420 (citations omitted).
57. Id.at421.
58. Id. at 421-22. Federal litigants are not prohibited from litigating constitutional claims
in state court. Litigants who submit claims to state court will be bound by the state court
decision and will not be able to avoid a contrary decision by relitigating the claims in federal
court. Id. at 419.
Commentators have criticized this procedure because the "shuttling" of cases between federal
and state courts exacerbates the potential for delay already inherent in Pullman abstention. See
Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 52 (4th ed. 1983); Martha A. Field, Abstention in
Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071,
1985 (1974) (where author observes that substantial delay occurs due to "shuttling" between
federal and state court). However, the England court justified this delay because the federal
plaintiff had the option of avoiding the delay by submitting all issues to the state court. England,
375 U.S. at 418 (plaintiff may waive the right to federal court and submit his entire case to state
courts, thus avoiding much of the delay and expense associated with the abstention process).
The delay associated with Pullman abstention merits particular consideration where a state
statute is challenged on grounds that it inhibits First Amendment freedoms. Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360, 379 (1964). Because the delay from abstention would seriously inhibit the
realization of First Amendment rights, these claims are exempt from Pullman abstention. See,
e.g., Zwicker v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404
(1974) (where First Amendment challenge involved, abstention was inappropriate). Cf. Babbitt
v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 308-09 (1979) (court abstained from
deciding First Amendment challenge to an ambiguous state law limiting deceptive union
publicity aimed at consumers of agricultural products). The Court's concern over the
heightened cost of abstention involving First Amendment rights has also been expressed in cases
involving basic civil liberties. See, e.g., Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965).
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B. Burford Abstention-Deference to State Sovereignty and Policies
Burford abstention emerged from Burford v. Sun Oil Company59
and has its origins in the equitable powers of the court.6" The
"Burford Doctrine" considers the independence of state governments
in carrying out domestic policy, and seeks to avoid conflict between
state and federal courts.61 Through Burford abstention, the federal
courts can give "proper regard for the rightful independence of state
governments in carrying out their domestic policy."62
Subsequent case law has clarified this doctrine, recognizing
essentially two applications.63 The initial application, as set forth in
the Burford case itself, is that abstention is appropriate where a
determination by a federal court would be "disruptive of state efforts
to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern."" The second application occurs when there are"difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
59. 319 U.S 315 (1943).
60. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996). Lower federal courts have
disagreed on the propriety of abstention in cases involving legal rather than equitable claims.
Compare Tribune Co. v. Abiloa, 66 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Burford abstention is generally
appropriate in cases where equitable relief is sought"), Garamendi v. Allstate Insurance Co., 47
F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1995) ("A District Court may not abstain under Burford when the
plaintiff seeks only legal relief."), Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 777 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nigaard, J.
concurring) ("Burford abstention is simply not available when legal, rather than equitable or
declaratory, relief is sought."), Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d. 876, 882 (1st Cir. 1993) (abstention
is improper in cases asserting only inequitable claims), and University of Maryland v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing that Burford abstention is
limited to federal courts sitting in equity, although case was in law), with Riley, 45 F.3d at 772,
n.7 (Hutchinson, J., expressing doubt that the restriction against applying Burford abstention in
non-equitable suits is still good law), General Glass Industries v. Monsour Medical Foundation,
973 F.2d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1992) ("decisional authority remains inconclusive as to whether
Burford abstention may be ordered only in cases of inequitable nature .... ), Taffet v. Southern
Co. 930 F.2d 847, 853 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Though abstention rulings premised upon
principles of comity and federalism were originally developed in the context of actions seeking
equitable relief, those principles have also been applied to actions seeking monetary damages."),
and Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d 1033, 1044
(3d Cir. 1988) ("If the relief sought is legal and the disruption is of the extent and character
suggesting that Burford abstention is appropriate, a refusal to abstain simply because the federal
court is not sitting as a court of equity makes no sense.").
61. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 727-28.
62. Burford, 319 U.S. at 318 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935).
63. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361
(1989) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814).
64. Id. In New Orleans Public Service, Inc., the court found that the mere existence of a
state administrative scheme of local interest was insufficient to justify Burford abstention. 491
U.S. at 361-64 (1989). The court noted that the federal adjudication must create the possibility
of disrupting a state's ability to develop and implement a regulatory response to the treatment of
an "essentially local problem" before a Burford abstention is warranted. Id. at 362 (quoting
Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951).
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substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in
the case then at bar. ,
65
In essence, Burford abstention seeks to serve as a preserving
agent for the sovereignty of the states. Dual sovereignty is a defining
feature of this country's system of government.66 Under the federalist
system, the states share concurrent sovereignty with the federal
government which is only limited by the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.67 The Constitution created a federal government of
limited powers" and the states retain sovereign authority where the
Constitution does not recognize the supremacy of federal authority.
69
Burford abstention acknowledges that state legislatures have created
their respective state court systems as an integral part of an
administrative system that regulates activities of substantial interest to
65. Id.at361.
66. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). For the advantages and disadvantages
of the dual sovereignty system see generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-
10 (1988).
Originally, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could not directly legislate the
American people, but could do so only with the approval of the states. New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992) ("Congress could not directly tax or legislate upon individuals;
it had no explicit 'legislative' or 'governmental' power to make binding 'law' enforceable as
such.") (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty & Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1447 (1987)
(quoting 1 J.Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 170 n.2. (1833)). The
inadequacy of the federal government to directly legislate was responsible in part for the
Constitutional Convention. New York, 505 U.S. at 163. The Constitutional Convention sought
to restructure Congress and give it the power to legislate without the need of state legislatures.
Alexander Hamilton addressed this issue in The Federalist No. 16 by stating:
(the new national government] must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It
must stand in need of no intermediate legislations .... The government of the
Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes
and fears of individuals ....
The Federalist No. 16 at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). During the
Constitutional Convention, delegates debated two different plans-the Virginia and New Jersey
Plans by which the federal government could exercise its powers. New York, 505 U.S. at 164.
Under the Virginia Plan, Congress could zxercise legislative authority directly without
employing the states as intermediaries. Id. (citing 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at
21 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter "Records"]. The New Jersey Plan mirrored the status
quo and Congress would continue to require the approval of the states before legislating. 1
Records at 243-44. A repeated objection to the New Jersey Plan was that it might require
Congress to coerce the states into implementing legislation. New York, 505 U.S. at 164.
Consequently, the Convention adopted a constitution in which Congress would exercise its
legislative authority directly over individuals, rather than over states. Id. at 165. One reason for
adopting the Virginia Plan was to avoid coercing states as separate sovereign entities. Instead,
Congress would be able to legally coerce individuals. Id.
67. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl 2.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
69. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457; see generally, Merritt, supra note 66, at 3-10.
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the state,7° giving the courts broad discretion to participate in the
development of regulatory policy.71 Burford abstention also recognizes
the discretion state courts have in devising remedies in the regulatory
context and that, because state courts may be acting as part of the
state's administrative system, federal participation in a case may
interfere with a state's ability to create and develop a consistent
regulatory policy.
72
C. Younger Abstention-Avoiding Interference with Pending State
Criminal Proceedings
Younger abstention73 was enunciated in Younger v. Harris.4
Under Younger abstention, "a federal court should not enjoin a state
criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit
except in very unusual situations, where necessary to prevent
immediate irreparable injury. '7'  The Younger doctrine represents a
70. See Peter M. Shane, Judicial Independence and Accountability: Interbranch Accountability
in State Government and the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 42-43 (Summer 1998) (discussing states' separation of powers issues
raised by the administrative code of state courts).
71. Oftentimes state legislatures make the state courts an integral part of an administrative
system that regulates activities of substantial interest to the state. When states grant regulatory
power to their courts they grant two forms of discretion. First, they grant discretion to devise
remedies that are appropriate given the particular facts at issue. Second, they vest in the courts
the discretion to decide whether to grant relief at all.
72. Courts are divided on whether Burford abstention must be premised upon the existence
of prior state administrative agency action. Compare Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 733 (1996) (Kennedy J. concurring) ("[t]he fact that a state court rather than an
agency was chosen to implement California's scheme provided more reason, not less, for the
Federal Court to stay its hand."), Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1995)
(agencies role in dispute was not essential to Burford abstention), and Friedman v. Revenue
Management, 38 F.3d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1994) (Burford abstention appropriate in absence of
agency action) with St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[t]he
concerns of governing the Burford abstention doctrine are not present in the instant case. St.
Paul's lawsuit does not involve a state administrative proceeding. ").
73. See generally Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992); New Orleans Public Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S.
193 (1988). The Younger doctrine has been criticized by scholars. See, e.g., Owen W. Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977); John Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1087 (1978); Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for
Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193; Aviam Soifer & Hugh C. MacGill, The Younger
Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1977).
74. 401 U.S 37 (1971).
75. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971). See also Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816
(observing that "abstention is inappropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently
invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state
criminal proceedings."). Although the Younger doctrine has equitable origins, the Supreme
Court has, in large part, abandoned the equitable foundation in cases subsequent to Younger.
See George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Rethinking the
Younger Abstention 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 120 n.56 (1990) (post Younger cases have
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judicial effort by federal district courts to avoid "undue interference"
with state court proceedings. 76 The Supreme Court has extended the
application of this type of abstention to include "civil enforcement
proceedings,77 [including] civil proceedings involving certain orders
that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform
their judicial functions. "78
In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar
Assoc. ,79 the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for application
of Younger abstention: (1) the proceedings must be ongoing;8" (2) the
strayed from the equitable rationale); Rehnquist, supra note 29, at 1088 n. 219, 1089 (same);
Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co., v. Texaco Inc.,
57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1007 (1989) (Younger's progeny toppled the equitable pillar in favor
of federalism and comity); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeus Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991,
1042 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court has eroded the equitable foundation to the
doctrine). Numerous lower court cases have addressed Younger as a case based on comity and
federalism as opposed to equity. See, e.g., Warmus v. Melahn, 62 F.3d 252, 255 (8th Cit. 1995)
vacated 517 U.S. 1241 (1996) (Younger abstention has its roots in comity and federalism);
Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1084 n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (Younger doctrine is founded in
federalism and comity); Gwyned Properties v. Lower Gwyned Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1199-
2000 (3d Cir. 1992) (same).
76. Several federal courts have concluded that adjudication of damage actions does not
"unduly" interfere with state proceedings to a level contemplated by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e conclude that the district
court abused its discretion by refusing, based on its unwarranted reliance on Younger, to exercise
its jurisdiction over Alexander's § 1983 [damages]"); Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court, 883
F.2d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Additionally, we do not believe that consideration of the section
1983 damages claim ... will in any way interfere with the state proceedings. The interest of
comity and federalism underlying the Younger abstention are therefore inapplicable.") Lapat v.
Serber, Civ. A. 95-1021, 1995 WL 481493 at *2 (E.D. Pa. August 1, 1995) ("[d]efendants have
not demonstrated as a matter of law ... how the proceedings in this court will interfere with the
state court proceedings."); Rubin v. Smith, 817 F. Supp. 987, 992-93 (D. N.H. 1993) (in a §
1983 action for damages, abstention was rejected "because this court's decision will not enjoin or
interfere with any state proceeding [which is] pending. The present situation is not the type
contemplated by the Younger abstention doctrine") (citations omitted).
77. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368
(1989) (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431
U.S. 434, 444 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979)). In Huffman, 420 U.S. 592
(1975) the court expanded Younger to encompass quasi-criminal cases. Following Huffman the
Court expanded Younger to include not only quasi-criminal cases. See Moore v. Simms, 442
U.S. 415 (1979) (applying Younger to a Texas child welfare agency case involving the loss of
custody of a child based on allegations of child abuse); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434
(1977) (applying Younger to attachment proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)
(applying Younger to appeals of contempt of court and judgment creditor actions). Younger has
also been applied to non-judicial cases. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
299 (1984).
78. New Orleans Public Serv., 491 U.S. at 368 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336, n.
12 (1977) (civil contempt order); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987)
(requirement for the posting of bond pending appeal)).
79. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
80. Id. at 432.
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proceedings must implicate important state interests;8' and (3) there
must be an adequate opportunity in the state court proceeding to raise
constitutional challenges.8 2
There is some confusion among the courts as to whether Younger
abstention is jurisdictional or discretionary. The Supreme Court first
determined that individual parties can waive the application of
Younger. 3 Later, the Court permitted the states to waive application
of Younger.14  The lower federal courts, however, have occasionally
recited the doctrine as being absolute.8"
Prior to the Court's decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance
Company, 6 a question existed as to whether Younger abstention was
appropriate when a state court defendant sought legal relief8 7 A
significant number of federal district courts have invoked Younger
abstention where legal relief is being sought by the federal court
plaintiff.88 A unanimous Court in Quackenbush held that a federal
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch. Inc., 477 U.S. 619
(1986) (holding that even if complainants in an administrative hearing could not raise First
Amendment objections, it was sufficient that the objections could be raised in judicial review of
the administrative hearings by the state courts).
83. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-97 n.3 (1975).
84. See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479-80
(1977).
85. See, e.g., Trust & Inv. Advisors Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1994)
("unlike other forms of abstention ... which explicitly vest[] the district court 'with
discretion' . . . application of the Younger doctrine is absolute .... [W]hen a case meets the
Younger criteria the district court must abstain.") (citing Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528,
534 (1965)); Cage v. Fairman, 95-C-3387, 1995 WL 743752, at *2 (N.D. Ill. December 13,
1995) ("under Younger and its progeny, federal courts must abstain .. "); Sun Refining and
Marketing Co. v. Brennan, 921 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[Wlhen the case is properly
within the Younger category of cases, there is no discretion on the part of federal courts to grant
injunctive relief.")).
86. 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
87. Id. at 719. (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202, and n. 6 (1988) (reserving
the question whether Younger requires abstention in an action for damages)). See Jeremy D.
Sosna, Comment, Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Continuing Saga of the Younger
Doctrine, 82 IOWA L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1996).
88. See, e.g., Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (electing to
stay proceedings rather than adjudicate a § 1983 damages action ); Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d
134, 137-39 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Younger doctrine authorizes the court to stay the
damages action pending the outcome of state court proceedings while not directly permitting
abstention) cert. denied 519 U.S 833 (1996); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15-
16 (1st Cir. 1992) (in dicta the court inferred that dismissal of a damages action pursuant to
Younger was proper. However, the court did not address the issue because the parties waived
application of the abstention doctrine); Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1989)
(staying the federal damages action); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1988)
(same) cert. denied 488 U.S. 851 (1988); Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (where damages action would "have a substantially disruptive effect upon ongoing state
proceedings Younger abstention may be appropriate") (citations omitted); Giulini v. Blessing,
654 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1981) (staying a damages action pursuant to the Younger
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district court does not have the authority to abstain when the district
court plaintiff seeks only non-discretionary relief.89  While the
Quackenbush decision only expressly spoke in relation to Burford
abstention, because of the context of and justifications for Younger
abstention are based upon equitable principles, Quackenbush may also
be regarded as a constraint on a federal court's power to invoke the
principles of Younger in cases at law.9
D. Colorado River Abstention-Only Where There Is an "Exceptional
Circumstance"
The Supreme Court has subsequently tied the above variations
on abstention together under the broader category of "exceptional
circumstances."'" While emphasizing that the abstention doctrine
generally remains a very narrow exception to the axiom requiring the
exercise of federal jurisdiction,92 the Supreme Court, in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States,9 held that where there
are "exceptional circumstances" relating to "[w]ise judicial
administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of litigation,"94  these exceptional
circumstances should be weighed against the duty to exercise federal
jurisdiction.9
In Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.," a plurality of the Court
contradicted the Colorado River "exceptional circumstances" doctrine.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, observed that whether the
district court should accept the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court
was a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
97
doctrine); Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); McCurry v. Allen,
606 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979) (same) reversed on other grounds 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
89. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730. The Court did not delineate between broad categories of
"equitable" or legal relief. Id. Reviewing various abstention doctrines as a function of "the
historic discretion exercised by federal courts 'sitting in equity."' Id. at 718. After
distinguishing all authority to the contrary, id. at 720, the Court held that abstention in damages
actions contravened the principles of abstention. Id. at 721.
90. See Sosna, supra note 87, at 283-84.
91. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-17.
92. E.g., the Supreme Court has recently observed that "the power to dismiss recognized in
Burford represents an 'extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of the District Court to
adjudicate a controversy properly before it."' Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
728 (1996) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813).
93. 424 U.S. 800.
94. Id. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180,
183 (1952)).
95. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-19.
96. 437 U.S. 655, 665-67 (1978).
97. Id. at 664.
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Justice Rehnquist observed that "it is well established that the
pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning the same matter in the federal court having jurisdiction. '"98
However, Justice Rehnquist also added that "it is equally well settled
that a district court is 'under no compulsion to exercise that
jurisdiction,'.., where the controversy may be settled more
expeditiously in the state court."99 He emphasized that the "right to
proceed with a duplicative action in a federal court can never be said to
be 'clear and undisputable."""0  Five justices joined the plurality in
Calvert, establishing the principle that any likelihood of duplicative
litigation was sufficient to justify abstention."1  This plurality
contradicts the exceptional circumstances requirement of Colorado
River.
°2
The conflicting holdings of Colorado River and Calvert were
clarified in Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.' 3 The Court in Moses held that the Colorado River "exceptional
circumstances" test should be used by district courts in determining to
stay an action in favor of state court proceedings." 4 In reaffirming the
Colorado River test, the Moses court formulated two additional factors
for the "exceptional circumstances" test: (1) the determination of
which forum's substantive law would govern the merits of the
litigation; and (2) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the rights
of parties."0 ' The court in Moses rejected the Calvert plurality and the
argument that Calvert had substantively changed the law,0 6
reaffirming the doctrine that federal courts have a "[virtual]
unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction given to them. 1
07
98. Id. at 662 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910).
99. Id. at 662-63 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942).
100. Id. at 666 n.8.
101. Id.at663-64.
102. 424 U.S. at 818-20 (1976). Several lower courts reached different views of Calvert's
significance. Compare Klingenberg v. Bobbin Publications, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 173 (D. D.C.
1982) (abstention appropriate where similar parties are litigating similar claims in state and
federal court) and American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Phillip Carey Corp., 482 F. Supp. 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same) with Western Auto Supply Co. v. Anderson, 610 F.2d 1126, 1127 (3d
Cir. 1979) (rejecting argument that Calvert expanded trial court discretion).
103. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
104. Id. at 13-19.
105. Id. at 23-27. Five justices in Calvert (four dissenters and Justice Blackman
concurring) supported the consideration of controlling state law as a new factor. Calvert, 437
U.S. at 677 (Blackman, J. concurring).
106. Id. at 16-19.
107. Id. at 15. After Moses the circuit courts were divided over which standard governed a
district court's decision to stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment action in which there were
parallel state proceedings. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth circuits applied the discretionary
standard articulated in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) and Calvert.
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While the Pullman, Burford and Younger abstention doctrines are
the three general categories of "exceptional circumstances,'108 if the
facts do not fall within the three general categories of abstention, there
are other principles that can give rise to application of abstention."9
E. Brillhart-Abstention under the FDJA
1. Brillhart Abstention Generally
The various doctrines of abstention discussed in Part I have been
held to apply to specific instances involving declaratory judgment
actions.' However, a separate line of cases addresses the application
of abstention in specific relation to Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
actions that interpret the boundaries of the district courts' discretion
to entertain such actions."' As was previously discussed, the doctrine
See, e.g., Terra Nova Insurance Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1223 (3d Cir. 1989);
Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (the "exceptional circumstances" test
of Colorado River and Moses is inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) (same);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Robsac Industries, 947 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1991);
Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1991) (Colorado River test does
not apply to declaratory relief actions because they have "special status").
However, other circuit courts have applied the narrow exceptional circumstances test
developed in Colorado River and expanded in Moses. See, e.g., Employers Insurance of Wassau
v. Missouri Electric Works, 23 F.3d 1372, 1374 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (following Colorado River
and Moses the district court was not justified in staying or dismissing a declaratory relief action
absent "exceptional circumstances"); Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1986) (same). A middle ground between these two
positions can be found. See, e.g., Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gill, Inc., 782 F.2d 306, 308-11 (lst
Cir. 1986) (where the state court has expended significant resources through the adjudicatory
process of the state law claims, federal courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action).
108. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-17.
109. Id. at 817 (stating that "[a]lthough this case falls within none of the abstention
categories, there are principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication
and regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous
exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts.").
110. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943)
(holding that a federal court must abstain from hearing declaratory judgment action challenging
constitutionality of a state tax); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1971) (extending
Younger abstention to declaratory judgment actions); Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277,
282 (1995) (stating that federal courts have "discretion in determining whether and when to
entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies
subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites").
111. In Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., the Supreme Court found that the various forms of
the abstention doctrine had been extended to "certain classes of declaratory judgments, the
granting of which is generally committed to the court's discretion." 517 U.S. at 718. It is
interesting to note that in Huffman, 319 U.S. at 297, and Samuels, 401 U.S. at 69-70, the
Supreme Court recognized that the actions were brought pursuant to the FDJA but did not
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of abstention in FDJA actions stems from the Act itself, which states
the court "ma declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party."" 2  The significance of this language is that, as
opposed to other federal actions, the granting of jurisdiction over
FDJA actions is discretionary and not compulsory."' Based upon this
language, the federal courts have essentially created a separate
variation of abstention specifically relating to jurisdiction under the
FDJA.
The most common scenario giving rise to application of the
modern abstention doctrine in the FDJA context occurs when a
parallel case is pending in state court at the time the federal district
court is being asked to exercise its discretion to accept jurisdiction
under FDJA."4 The court's discretion to deny jurisdiction in those
cases is generally analyzed using the doctrine set forth in Brillhart v.
Excess Insurance Company of America.' In Brilihart, the Excess
Insurance Company of America brought suit for declaratory relief in
federal court to determine its obligation in a pending state court
proceeding." 6 The Brilihart court found that it would "ordinarily be
uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a
declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state
court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between
the same parties. "117
In determining whether to abstain, the court in Brillhart
suggested that district courts should look to whether the controversy
can better be settled in the state court proceeding." 8 The Court stated
that this analysis may require "inquiry into the scope of the pending
state court proceeding and the nature of defenses open there. "'
' 9
Further, "[t]he federal court may have to consider whether the claims
of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that
proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined, whether such
parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc.'
' 21
apply the discretion under this statute but rather applied different forms of the abstention
doctrine.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (emphasis added).
113. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. at 286-87; Government Employees Ins. Co.
v. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1223.
114. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996).
115. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
116. Id. at 492.
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Doubt on the validity of the application of the Supreme Court's
analysis in Brilihart was cast by the Colorado River line of cases
discussed in Part I.D. above. 12' However, in Wilton v. Seven Falls
Company,122 the Supreme Court confirmed that the Brillhart test, not
the "exceptional circumstances" test described in Colorado River,
governs a district court's exercise of discretion in a FDJA action
during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings. 2 1 Thus, the
abstention applicable under the FDJA was a unique, self-contained
division of the doctrine. Unlike all other variations of the abstention
doctrine, "exceptional circumstances" did not have to exist for the
court to abstain. A lower bar had been set.
The Brillhart analysis exists to support the important issues of
community, judicial economy, and federalism.'24 Those issues are
generally of concern when there is a separate pending state court case
containing additional state law issues, especially if the state action
contains non-removable state court claims. The Brillhart analysis asks
whether another state case involving the same parties would be able to
also address the controversy in the declaratory judgment action.125
These questions imply the existence of a separate state court action
that could add a request for declaratory relief as an additional claim, as
opposed to the situation where the "state case" is identical to the
federal court action.
26
Accordingly, the application of abstention under the FDJA as set
forth in Brilihart is limited. Specifically, the court in Wilton noted
that it was not making a finding as to the appropriate boundaries of
discretion in cases in which there were no parallel pending state court
proceedings.127 The court in Wilton solely held that application of the
Brillhart test was appropriate when a parallel proceeding, already
underway in state court, presented an opportunity for the controversy
in the declaratory judgment action to be heard. 2  The Brillhart
121. In Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), the plurality endorsed the
Brillhart reasoning in contradiction to the "exceptional circumstances" test set forth in Colorado
River. Id. at 655-57. However, the Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) decision confirmed the validity of the "exceptional circumstances test."
See supra, Part I.D.
122. 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
123. Id. at 289-90.
124. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1226.
125. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282-283.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 290.
128. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Wilton decision is silent as to the
boundaries of discretion in this scenario, and also recognized the need for guidance on the issue.
See Budget Rent-A-Car v. Crawford, 108 F.3d 1075, 1079-1080 (9th Cir. 1997). In Crawford,
the Ninth Circuit did not set a clear guideline for asserting discretion in declaratory judgment
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analysis, therefore, has not been held to apply to cases that do not also
have pending parallel state court actions.
129
2. Application of Brillhart Abstention
While the Supreme Court has not specifically delineated a set of
factors to be applied pursuant to Brillhart, some of the lower courts
have done so. Relevant to the specific discussion of this article, the
Ninth Circuit has provided one of the most comprehensive lists of
factors for assessing the application of abstention under Brillhart. The
Ninth Circuit has determined that the Brillhart analysis advises the
district court to avoid: (1) needless determination of state law issues;
(2) declaratory actions filed as a means of forum shopping; 3 and, (3)
duplicative litigation. 3'
actions where there were no parallel state court cases pending. Instead, the court held that a
district court must first weigh whether existing state court remedies will provide adequate
remedies. Id. at 1081-82. Crawford was overruled by Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol,
133 F.3d at 1227. With that portion of Crawford overturned, the Ninth Circuit is once again left
without guidance for the boundaries of discretion in actions like those presented in Huth v.
Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2002). Crawford also held abstention
could be justified if the declaratory judgment action was filed in anticipation of a filing of a state
court proceeding and in fact was a form of forum shopping. Crawford, 108 F.3d at 1080-81.
129. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289-90.
130. The term "forum shopping" was first used in a judicial opinion in 1951. See Covey
Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1951). Earlier, the phrase "shopping
for a forum" was used by the Court in Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad, 315 U.S. 698, 706 (1942)
(Jackson, J. concurring). The concept was targeted in Erie Railroad v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
As a phrase, "forum shopping" has relative limited descriptive content because litigants make
forum choices either through action or inaction any time that a decision would affect the selected
forum. As an example, plaintiffs have primary control over forum selection. See, e.g.,
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987) (plaintiff is the "master of the claim.")
Defendants can also engage in forum selection activity through removal of a case from state court
to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). Defendants indirectly participate in forum
selection by challenging personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). A dismissal can be sought on the basis of forum non conveniens. See,
e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (permitting a
federal court to transfer a civil action to a different district "(flor the convenience of the parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice."). Forum shopping can indirectly occur where a
defendant accepts jurisdiction where constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts do not exist.
See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-
04 (1982).
Some commentators have viewed forum shopping as improperly manipulative of the system.
See generally John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1111 (1992)
(the term forum shopping has a "disreputable" connotation); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum
Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553 (1989) ("As a rule, counsel, judges
and academicians employ the term 'forum shopping' to reproach a litigant who, in their opinion,
unfairly exploits jurisdictional or venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit. But in spite of
the phrase's pejorative connotation, forum shopping remains popular."). An interesting response
can be found in Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990), in which the court noted
that "parties may legitimately try to obtain the jurisdiction of federal courts, as long as they
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Upon examining the first factor of the Brilihart analysis, whether
the determination of state law by a federal court is unnecessary, it can
be observed that cases in federal court by way of diversity of
citizenship often rest on the application of the state law. 32 Therefore,
this factor bears tangential relevance to the determination of the
application of abstention under certain limited circumstances. Such
circumstances where the federal court should abstain under this factor
include: (1) when the case presents "difficult questions of state law
bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose
importance transcends the result in the case at bar;" (2) when the case
involves essential local issues arising out of a complicated state
regulatory scheme, such as sensitive areas of social policy; or (3) when
the adjudication of the case by a federal court "would be disruptive of
state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of
substantial public concern. '
The lack of a novel issue of a state law, or additional state law
claims, weighs in favor of retaining federal jurisdiction. 34 When a
routine state law issue is in question, a federal court can "just as
efficiently decide" the matter as a state court can. 3 ' Nevertheless, the
mere fact that a state law issue is difficult or the answer is uncertain
does not, in and of itself, automatically constitute grounds for
abstention.'36 In fact, the presence of state law issues in a federal
lawfully qualify under some of the grounds that allow access to this form of limited jurisdiction."
Id. at 1068 (quoting U.S.I. Properties Corp. v. M.D. Construction Co., 860 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1988)). "[A] party's motive in preferring a federal tribunal is immaterial." Id. (citing Chicago v.
Mills, 204 U.S. 321, 330 (1907)). Thus, the Nolan court acknowledged the legitimacy of forum
shopping when the shopping is done within the rules.
131. These factors were recognized and adopted by the Ninth Circuit. See Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225; Continental Casualty Co. v. Robsac Ind., 947 F.2d
1367, 1371-1373 (9th Cir. 1991).
132. These factors were recognized and adopted by the Ninth Circuit. See Dizol, 133 F.3d
at 1225; Continental Casualty Co. v. Robsac Ind., 947 F.2d 1367, 1371-1373 (9th Cir. 1991).
133. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813-17. See also Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043,
1048 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989); Lehman v. City of Louisville, 967 F.2d 1474, 1478 (10th Cir. 1992).
134. See, e.g., United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that because declaration of coverage for vandalism coverage under commercial property
insurance policy did not involve novel issues of state law, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in retaining jurisdiction); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 591 n.10 (5th Cir.
1994) ("A district court's dismissal of a lawsuit simply because it involves an issue of state
law.. .would not be proper.").
135. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d at 494.
136. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764, 776 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Abbott
Labs, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (Novelty or complexity of state law issues standing alone
is not enough to compel abstention.); Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F2d 878, 883 (1st Cir. 1993)
(Presence of difficult or unresolved questions of local law does not, without more, justify
abstention by federal court properly sitting in diversity.).
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declaratory judgment action is rarely considered a proper ground to
abstain from jurisdiction.137
The second factor of the Ninth Circuit's Brilihart analysis,
whether the declaratory action was filed as a means of forum
shopping, "usually is understood to favor discouraging an insurer
from forum shopping. For example, filing a federal court declaratory
action to see if it might fare better in federal court at the same time the
insurer is engaged in a state court action." 3 In other words, federal
137. See, e.g., Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Bristol-Myer Squibb Co., 214 F.3d 562, 566 (5th
Cir. 2000) ("[O]nly rarely will 'the presence [a] state law issue[] weigh[] in favor of' abstention,
and even where the state court can adequately protect all parties, this fact 'can only be a neutral
factor or one that weighs against ... abstention."'); Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that abstention cannot be justified merely because case arises entirely under state
law); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Missouri Elec. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1372, 1376 (8th Cir.
1984) (holding that presence of state law issues weigh in favor of abstention only in rare
circumstances).
138. Aetna Cas. Co. v. Krieger, 181 F.3d, 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court
has denounced state and federal forum shopping on grounds of comity and parity. See, e.g.,
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court has
countenanced interstate forum shopping. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S.
770 (1984). Courts have offered little justification for differentiating their treatment of state-
federal and interstate forum shopping. See Lea Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty
and the Two Faces of Federalism: A Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of
Laws, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833, 833-35 (1985); Neuborne, supra note 29, at 1105; Patrick J.
Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for
Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 96 (1992) ("preventing interstate forum shopping
only encourages interstate forum shopping. As long as the states have different rules on this
subject, sophisticated litigants will travel to the state in which the law is most favorable.").
There are three reasons that are generally used to criticize forum shopping: (1) forum shopping
undermines the authority of substantive state law, see Erie Railroad v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. at
78-79; (2) forum shopping overburdens certain courts and creates unnecessary expenses as
litigants pursue the most favorable rather than the simplest or closest forum; (3) forum shopping
may create a negative popular perception about the equity of the legal system. See Hanna v.
Plumber, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). Some courts generally discourage forum shopping. See, e.g.,
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc., Inc. v. Asociacion de Empleados de Casino de Puerto Rico, 873
F.2d 479, 485 (1st Cir. 1989) (observing that it is "wise" to "discourage forum shopping");
Ojeda Rios v. Wigen, 863 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1988) (observing that "forum shopping is to be
discouraged.").
Erie Railroad v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) abolished the long held doctrine under Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), whereby federal courts in diversity cases followed state rules of
decision on certain local issues but otherwise were free to create and follow common law.
Currently the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), requires federal courts to apply
state law in diversity cases. Erie eliminated the incentive for state and federal forum shopping by
requiring federal courts in diversity cases to apply the substantive law of the state in which they
sit. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. See also Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 141 (3d Cir. 1979)
(commenting on the Erie decision: "[t]he decision to require that federal courts apply state
substantive law in diversity cases represented a preference for vertical uniformity of substantive
law within each state over horizontal uniformity among federal courts nationwide.") (quoting
Witherow v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 1976)). See also J.
Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV.
317, 333 (1967) ("the lack of uniformity in state substantive law, compounded by proliferation
by state long arm statutes, has made forum shopping, among both federal and state courts, a
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 27:751
courts should generally decline to entertain "reactive" declaratory
judgment actions. 139  Reactive litigation finds its most common
application in the insurance law context, where declaratory judgment
actions are routinely used by insurance companies and insureds to
anticipate each others claims.14 Thus, a declaratory judgment action
by an insurance company against its insured during the pendency of a
"non-removable"' 141 state court action presenting the same issues of
state law is a "reactive" litigation.
142
national and legal past time.") The Erie doctrine was extended in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). In Klaxon the Court held that federal courts must also apply the
forum state's choice of law rules. Id. at 496.
139. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225.
140. See Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1246 n.1l (lth Cir.
2000) (declaratory judgment actions are "routinely used by potential litigants").
141. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th
Cir. 1996), and therefore any case which is removed must be one which, at the time of removal,
could have been brought in federal court initially. See, e.g., Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 99 F.3d. 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1996).
Removal of cases to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441-1452 (1982) and (Supp. IV
1986) as amended by the JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS AND ACCESS To JUSTICE ACT PUB. L.
100-702 § 1016, 102 stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988). A defendant's removal of a case to federal court
is subject to two general remand statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c) and 1147(c) (1982), as amended
by the JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT PUB. L. 100-102 § 1016, 102
stat. 4642, 4670 (1988). Both the plaintiff and the court may question the propriety of the
removal under these statutes. See, e.g., Mark Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: When and How
Federal Trial Court Remand Orders are Reviewable, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395 (1987). Removal
statutes are strictly construed, and all doubts regarding removability are resolved in favor or
remand to state court. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1941). The
burden of establishing removal jurisdiction rests with the party seeking removal, and the burden
applies both to establishing federal jurisdiction and to following the appropriate procedures.
Allen v. R &H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995).
Federal question jurisdiction exists over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). For federal question
jurisdiction, a case is deemed to "arise under" federal law for § 1331 purposes whenever federal
law, either expressly (see Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421 (1883)) or impliedly (Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Defendants of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)) creates the
cause of action upon which plaintiff is suing. See Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 2 (1983). The suit must "really and substantially" involve a dispute
regarding the "validity, construction or effect of the law upon the determination of which the
result depends." Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912). See also Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (federal question jurisdiction requires that the federal issue "be an
element, and an essential one, of plaintiffs cause of action").
Statutory diversity jurisdiction exists over controversies between citizens of different states,
and between a state or citizen thereof and a foreign state or its citizens where the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). The
bulk of removal disputes involve diversity or federal question jurisdiction. Gordon D. Polozola,
The Battle of Removal-Is Delay the Ultimate Weapon?: A Note on Martine v. National Tea Co.,
54 LA. L. REV. 1419,1423-24 (1994).
142. Continental Cas. Co. v. Robsac, Ind., 947 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting
that allowing declaratory judgment action to proceed while there is a non-removable state action
would circumvent diversity jurisdiction).
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The third Brilihart factor given by the Ninth Circuit, whether
the action would be duplicative of an action already proceeding before
a state court, stems from the concern expressed by the Supreme Court
that .'[g]ratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive
disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided."
1 43
Essentially, this Brillhart factor is focused on federal interference with
ongoing state litigation.'44 Therefore, the application of this factor
requires the presence of a pending parallel state proceeding.
The Brillhart factors enunciated by the Ninth Circuit are not
exhaustive. 4 ' Several circuits have expanded these factors,'46 and the
Ninth Circuit itself has held that a district court may also consider, for
example, whether a subsequent declaratory judgment action (either in
federal or state court) is filed merely for the purposes of procedural
fencing.'47 In addition, it has been observed that a district court may
consider (1) whether a declaratory action will settle all aspects of the
controversy; (2) whether the declaratory action will serve a useful
purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; (3) whether the
declaratory action is being sought merely for the purpose of obtaining
143. Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991).
144. Id.
145. Dizol, 133 F3d at 1225 n.5.
146. See, e.g., State Auto Ins. Companies v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2000)
(stating the following considerations: 1) "[a] general policy of restraint when the same issues are
pending in a state court;" 2) "[a]n inherent conflict of interest between an insurer's duty to
defend in a state court and its attempt to characterize that suit in federal court as falling within
the scope of a policy exclusion;" 3) " [a]voidance of duplicative litigation."); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v.
Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 968 (6th Cir. 2000) (considering the following factors: "(1) whether the
judgment would settle the controversy; (2) whether the declaratory judgment would serve a
useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is
being used merely for the purpose of 'procedural fencing' or 'to provide an arena for a race for res
judicata'; (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase the friction between federal
and state courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction;" (5) "whether there is an
alternative remedy that is better or more effective;" (6) "whether the underlying factual issues are
important to an informed resolution of the case; (7) whether the state trial court is in a better
position to evaluate those factual issues than is the federal court; and (8) whether there is a close
nexus between the underlying factual and legal issues and state law and/or public policy, or
whether federal common or statutory law dictates a resolution of the declaratory judgment
action."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 1937) (identifying the
following factors for a district court to use in determining whether to hear a declaratory judgment
action: (1) whether declaratory relief will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal
relations at issue; and (2) whether declaratory relief will terminate and afford relief from the
uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.); Nationwide Ins. v.
Zavalis, 52 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1995) (identifying four factors: (1) whether the issues in the
state and federal proceedings are distinct; (2) whether the parties are identical in the state and
federal proceedings; (3) whether going forward with the declaratory action will serve a useful
purpose in declaring the rights of the parties or amount to merely duplicative and piecemeal
litigation; and (4) whether comparable relief is available to the declaratory judgment plaintiff in
another forum or another time.).
147. Dizol, 133 F3d at 1225 n.5.
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a "res judicata" advantage; or (4) whether the use of a declaratory
action will result in entanglement of the parties; and the availability
and relative convenicnce of other remedies."'
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a district
court's decision to abstain from jurisdiction cannot rest on a
mechanical checklist of the factors. Instead, a court's decision must
rest "on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a
given case, with the balance heavily weighed in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction."'49 Therefore, in the Ninth Circuit for example, all the
relevant factors must be assessed, not simply the three factors
delineated in the Brillhart decision.15° However, the Ninth Circuit's
recent application of Brillhart abstention in Huth v. Hartford Insurance
Company of the Midwest'' has significantly expanded abstention while
at the same time nullifying the use and effect of the application of the
Brillhart decision.
1 52
II. HUTH V. HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST-
THE FINAL PHASE OF IMPLOSION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS
A. The Initial Step-The District Court Decision
In Huth v. Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest,' the
insurance company, Hartford, brought an action pursuant to the
FDJA seeking a declaration from the district court that Catt Michele
Huth, claiming insured status, was not entitled to underinsured
motorist benefits under her mother's policy because she was not a
resident of her mother's household." 4  Because of the coverage
dispute, Hartford initiated a declaratory judgment action in federal
court. One week after Hartford filed its declaratory judgment action
under the FDJA, Huth filed an identical action in Arizona state court
pursuant to the Arizona Declaratory Judgment Act,' claiming that
148. Id. (citing American States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Garth, J., concurring)).
149. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1983).
Stated differently, a district court's task "is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction." Id. at 25.
150. See Dizol, 133 F3d at 1225 n.5 (citing Kearns, 15 F.3d at 145 (Garth, J., concurring)).
151. 298 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2002).
152. See infra, Part II & III.
153. 298 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2002).
154. Id. at 802.
155. See A.R.S. § 12-1832 et. seq. Unlike the FDJA, Arizona's Declaratory Judgment Act
is not discretionary ("any person... may have determined any question of construction or
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she was entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the Hartford
policy.156  Hartford subsequently removed the state declaratory
judgment action to the Arizona Federal District Court based upon
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.' The state and federal
actions were then consolidated in federal court.'
Huth motioned the court to remand the state portion of the
consolidated action and simultaneously motioned the court to stay the
federal part of the consolidated action, requesting that the court
abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the FDJA.'59 The district
court granted both the motion to remand 6' and the motion to stay.1
6'
While the district court agreed that there was no presumption of
abstention in insurance coverage disputes generally, 162 the court held
that abstention was appropriate under the court's Brillhart analysis.
6 3
Addressing the Brillhart factors, the district court initially stated
that both actions rested upon state law issues exclusively and there
were no additional claims attached to either action which would
necessitate proceeding in federal court.'64 The court found the forum
shopping factor to be neutral because both parties sought different
forums to achieve an advantage for their case. 65  Further, the court
validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.")





161. Id. Abstention results in either a stay, see, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1959) or dismissal, see, e.g., Harris County Commissoner's Court
v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1975) of the federal actions.
162. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip op.
at 3-4 (D. Ariz. April 3, 2001). See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220,
1225 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "there is no presumption in favor of abstention in declaratory
actions generally, nor in insurance coverage cases specifically.").
163. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip op.
at 4 (D. Ariz. April 3, 2001).
164. Id. See also Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991)
(stating that in Brillhart, "the Court wanted to avoid having federal courts needlessly determine
issues of state law."). The Court in Brillhart warned that in regards to deciding complex state
law issues, "scattered opinions of an intermediate appellate court of a State may convey only
doubts and confusion to one inexpert in the law of that State and yet be entirely clear and
consistent when placed in the mosaic of the whole law of that State." Brillhart v. Excess Ins.
Co., 316 U.S. 491, 497 (1942).
165. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip op.
at 4 (D. Ariz. April 3, 2001). See also Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367 (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S.
at 495 (stating that the forum shopping factor arose out of "a concern that parties could attempt
to avoid state court proceedings by filing declaratory relief actions in federal court" and that
"[tihis kind of forum shopping could be avoided by requiring district courts to inquire into the
availability of state court proceedings to resolve all issues without federal intervention.")).
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held that the duplicative litigation factor was also neutral because,
irrespective of whether the case was remanded or the district court
decided to exercise its jurisdiction, all of the issues would be resolved
in either forum.'66 Accordingly, the court held that because the sole
issue in the case rested exclusively on state law and there was no other
basis for federal jurisdiction present, the state forum was more
appropriate than the federal forum where all other factors are
neutral. 167
B. One Giant Leap-The Ninth Circuit Appeal
Hartford appealed the decision'68 of the district court to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, asserting that
the district court had abused its discretion by remanding the state
court action and staying the federal court action.1 69 Hartford asserted
that the court improperly applied the Brillhart abstention doctrine
because there was no pending parallel state action in light of
Hartford's removal of the state action to federal court.1
70
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld the ruling of the district
court.17 ' First, the Ninth Circuit rejected Hartford's assertion that the
lack of a pending parallel state action affected the district court's
ability to exercise discretion under the Brillhart factors.77 The
existence of a pending parallel state action was only one part of the
balancing test to be applied by district courts in determining whether
to exercise jurisdiction under Brillhart.173  Despite recognizing the
166. Id. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip
op. at 4 (D. Ariz. April 3, 2001). See also Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367 (citing Brillhart, 316
U.S. at 495 (observing that in Brillhart, "the Court no doubt wanted to avoid duplicitous
litigation. As the Court noted, '[g]ratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive
disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.")).
167. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip op.
at 3-4 (D. Ariz. April 3, 2001).
168. Orders denying remand are interlocutory in nature and, thus, are not reviewable
except as part of an appeal from final judgment. See Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 99 F.3d. 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1996) (reviewing denial of remand as part of review of final
judgment).
"An order remanding a case to the State Court from which it was removed is not reviewable on
appeal or otherwise .. " 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994). Appellate review is limited to remand
based on the two grounds enumerated in § 1447(c). See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,
516 U.S. 124, 127 (1975) ("section 1447(d) must be read in pari materiai with section 1447(c)").
169. Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800,803-04 (9th Cir. 2002).
170. Id. at 802.
171. Id. at 804.
172. Id. at 802-03.
173. Id. (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995) ("We believe it more
consistent with the statute to vest district courts with discretion in the first instance, because
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existence of a pending parallel state action to be a factor in the case,
the court did not address whether this factor had been adequately
considered by the district court in its Brillhart analysis and instead
solely considered the district court's application of those factors that
were considered in the lower court's decision.'74 The court also
rejected Hartford's argument that the "exceptional circumstances" test
outlined in Colorado River applied. 7 Instead, the court found that the
Brillhart analysis affirmed in Wilton was the applicable abstention
standard.'76
In analyzing the court's application of the three factors
enumerated in Brillhart, the court observed that the "avoiding
duplicative litigation, factor was neutral in its application ... as [the
case would] be disposed of entirely in either the state or federal
forums."' 77 Additionally, the court agreed that the "avoiding forum
facts bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for
resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp.")).
However, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear state law claims
brought jointly with a federal claim in federal court wherein a case is removed to federal court,
even though the state law claims could not have been brought separately in federal court because
by themselves they do not have an independent basis in federal jurisdiction. See Richard D.
Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34; Arthur
R. Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 1 (1985); Note, Problems with
Judicial Power and Discretion in Federal Pendent Jurisdiction Cases, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
689 (1981). The state law claims must be closely related to the action which is within the court's
statutory jurisdiction. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-27 (1966), the
Supreme Court constructed a two prong test for pendent jurisdiction. First, "power" exists to
hear the state claim brought with the federal claim if both claims derive from a "common nucleus
of operative facts" and the "plaintiffs claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try
them all in one judicial proceeding." Id. at 725. This power need not be exercised in every case
because "[ilts justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims." Id. at 726. An intermediate part of the test was added after Gibbs which requires the
court to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would violate a particular federal policy or
whether it is an attempt by plaintiff to manufacture federal jurisdiction when it is otherwise
foreclosed by statute. Ambromovach v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989-90 (3rd Cir.
1984). Both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are judicial doctrines that permit a Federal Court
to exercise jurisdiction over a party or claim normally not within the scope of federal judicial
power. Comment, Bradford Gram Swing, Federal Common Law Power to Remand a Properly
Removed Case, 136 U.P.A. L. REV. 583, 584 n.9 (1987). Pendent jurisdiction concerns the
resolution of a plaintiffs federal and state law claims against a single defendant in one action.
Owen Equipment Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1987). Ancillary jurisdiction, on the other
hand, typically involves claims by a defending party hauled into court against his will, or by
another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he can assert them in an ongoing
action in a federal court. Id. at 376. Ancillary jurisdiction often arises in the context of
counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims and interpleaders.
174. Huth, 298 F.3d at 802-03.
175. Id. at 804.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 803-04.
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shopping" factor was neutral in its application due to the fact that
both parties simply sought to have the case litigated in a forum that
they believed to be more advantageous. 178  Turning to the "needless
determination of state law" factor, which was the basis of the district
court decision, the court admitted that there was "no great need for
state resolution.' 1 79 Nevertheless, the court held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise its jurisdiction
over the case because there was no presumption in favor of retaining
jurisdiction, essentially finding that the "needless determination"
factor was neutral as well. 8 '
178. Id. at 804. The term "forum shopping" typically refers to a party's act of seeking the
most advantageous venue in which to try a particular case. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 14 (attempting to have a case heard in a forum where it
has the greatest chance of success is commonly defined as "forum shopping"); Kimberly Jade
Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV.
267, 268 (1996) (when a party attempts to have its action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction
where the most favorable judgment or verdict may be rendered is "forum shopping"). Although
"forum shopping" has a pejorative connotation, various courts have recognized the place of
forum shopping as part of a potentially sound litigation strategy. See, e.g., Goad v. Celotex
Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987) ("there is nothing inherently evil about forum
shopping"), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988). The court in Celotex called forum shopping a
"sector... strawman depending on whose ox is being gored." Id. at 512. Indeed, Justice
Rehnquist in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984), provided that the Court
approvingly refers to the forum shopping strategy calling it "no different from the litigation
strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or procedural rules
for sympathetic, local populations." Id. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum
Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 825-26 (1987)
(recognizing that once two different courts are available in which to litigate disputes, there is an
incentive to forum shop). Indeed, selecting a forum is part of the social fabric. See, e.g., Michael
Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevancy of the Duty of Care Standard and Corporate
Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 65 (1990) (documenting the reincorporation of many firms in
Delaware to seek the protection of a new statute limiting directors' liability). Convenience of
counsel may be a strong motivator in the choice of forums. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study
of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U.
L. REV. 369, 400 (1992).
Commentators have written about the abuse of forum shopping. See Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Isenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 n.1
(1995) (the authors discuss examples of plaintiffs seeking venues in certain south Texas counties
where judges are sympathetic and juries are generous). See also Coast Manufacturing Co. v.
Caeylon, 600 F.Supp 696 (S.D. N.Y. 1985) where the court refused Rule 11 sanctions against
plaintiffs forum shopping efforts: "[I]t is understandable that litigants will do a small amount of
artful conniving to gain access to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, and for a long
time such efforts have been tolerated. It is our duty to protect the diversity jurisdiction from
abuses of the sort attempted here. In doing so, we need not become punitive." Id. at 698.
179. Huth, 298 F.3d at 804.
180. Id.
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III. WHERE THE HUTH DECISION TAKES US--UNDERSTANDING
THE EXPANSIVE NATURE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECTS
The Huth decision greatly expanded the abstention doctrine as it
relates not only to the FDJA but also declaratory judgment actions in
general.18' By affirming the decision of the district court, the Ninth
Circuit sanctioned the lower court's procedural maneuver in which the
district court first remanded the state court action based upon the
Brillhart abstention doctrine, and then proceeded, based upon the
same doctrine, to abstain from hearing the federal action asserting that
the claim would be better resolved in the post-remand "pending" state
action."' Accordingly, this decision has significant implications on
the federal court's exercise of jurisdiction under the FDJA and also the
ability of a party to seek resolution in the federal courts.
A. Remand in Relation to Federal Declaratory Judgment Act Discretion
The first issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
was whether the District Court erred in remanding the Arizona
declaratory judgment action to Arizona state courts." 3 Once a case is
removed, only limited circumstances will support remand." 4
181. See infra. Part III.
182. See Huth, 298 F.3d 800.
183. Huth, 298 F.3d at 802.
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994). A plaintiff may seek remand back to state court of an
improperly removed action. Id. A case may be remanded for procedural or jurisdictional
defects. If the removal defect is based on a procedural error, plaintiff has thirty days from the
filing of the removal notice to file a notice of remand. If this is not done, the procedural defect is
waived. See Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316,
327 (5th Cir. 1992). However, the courts are split over whether the district court may remand
sua sponte on the basis of a procedural defect. Compare Page v. City of South Field, 45 F.3d 128
(6th Cir. 1995) with In Re Continental Casualty Co., 29 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 1994). Removal
defects based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and the court may
even act sua sponte to remand the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1994). If a procedural or jurisdictional
defect renders removal improper, the courts have no discretion but to remand. Id. However,
some courts have created a practical exception to this rule, allowing the removing party to correct
a procedural defect within thirty days following removal. See O'Halloran v. University of
Washington, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Loftin v. Rush, 767 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1995);
Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980); Computer People, Inc. v.
Computer Dimensions Int'l, 638 F. Supp 1293 (M.D. La. 1986). This statute provides:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of
removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An
order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the
order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State
court may thereupon proceed with such case.
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Typically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), only a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or a defect in the removal procedures employed will
suffice.18 Therefore, "if jurisdiction exists and was properly invoked,
the Court has no discretion to remand."'
18 6
An examination of the facts in Huth reveals that neither lack of
subject matter jurisdiction nor a defect in removal procedures was
present." 7 There was complete diversity of citizenship between the
parties and the removal procedure was never challenged."88 Relying
upon Brillhart, Huth argued for a remand of the state portion of the
action and requested that the district court abstain from hearing the
federal portion of the action because the issues in the case were better
left to the state court to resolve." 9 Because this was the position
accepted by the district court and ultimately the Ninth Circuit, the
Arizona declaratory judgment action was remanded to state court via
the abstention doctrine, exercised pursuant to the discretion granted
under the FDJA."9 °
1. FDJA Discretion in Non-FDJA Actions?
Based upon the fact that Brillhart was the means by which the
state part of the action was remanded, the Ninth Circuit's decision to
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994).
185. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345 (1976) (noting that
the district court exceeded its authority "in remanding on grounds not permitted by the
controlling statute [28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)]." See also Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 239 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), remand of a properly removed case is permitted
only where there is a defect in removal procedure or a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction
present); Levy v. Weissman, 671 F.2d 766, 769 (3rd Cir. 1982) (no discretion to remand as a
sanction); Ryan v. State Bd. of Elections, 661 F.2d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1981) (no discretion to
remand as a form of abstention); In re Shell Oil. Co., 631 F.2d 1156, 1157-58 (5th Cir. 1980) (no
discretion to remand for failure to oppose motion to remand); Buchner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d
816, 819 (5th Cir. 1993); Huber v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 821, 822 (E.D. Wis.
1996); Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Assocs., 904 F. Supp. 870, 873 (N.D. Ind. 1995);
Burnette v. Godshall, 828 F. Supp. 1439, 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1993), affd sub nom., Burnette v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., 72 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995); Begley v. Maho Bay
Camps, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Rosciti Constr., Inc. v. Lot 10 of the East
Greenwich Town Assessor's Plat 14, 754 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D. R.I. 1991).
186. Burnette, 828 F. Supp. at 1444. See also Davis v. Joyner, 240 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.N.C.
1964) (observing that "where Congress has provided both a state and a federal forum, and has
further provided for actions first brought in the state court to be removed to the federal court, no
discretionary power exists to remand the case to state court.") (citation omitted).
187. See Huth, 298 F.3d 800.
.188. See Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip
op. at 3-4 (D. Ariz. April 3, 2001); Huth, 298 F.3d at 802.
189. Huth, 298 F.3d at 802. However, it should be noted that Huth did not contend that
this was a difficult issue of state law and the Ninth Circuit recognized that there was "no great
need for state court resolution." Id. at 804.
190. See id.
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affirm the remand of the action generally runs contrary to the
reasoning of the Supreme Court. 9 ' As was previously noted, in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,9 2 the
United States Supreme Court observed:
Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the
exception, not the rule. "The doctrine of abstention, under
which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the
exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow
exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it."' 93
The Supreme Court further noted that the "virtual unflagging
duty" of the district courts is to exercise federal jurisdiction when it
exists.' 94 Although the Court in Colorado River ultimately allowed
abstention, it did so only because of "exceptional circumstances."' 9
In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company,'96 the Supreme Court
stated that although abstention was traditionally applied only to cases
where the court has been asked to employ its historical equitable
powers, this has been extended to include cases in which the court has
discretion to grant or deny relief, including injunctive relief and
"certain classes" of declaratory judgments. 9 7 Therefore, according to
the Supreme Court, declaratory judgment actions are not subject to
the abstention doctrine generally, only under certain circumstances.198
Variations of the abstention doctrine, including Younger
abstention, Burford abstention, and generally the "exceptional
circumstances" described in Colorado River, have been applied to
declaratory judgment actions. 199 However, abstention pursuant to the
191. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). The Wilton Court stated
that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was unique in the discretion it provided to the courts.
The Court observed:
Distinct features of the Declaratory Judgment Act, we believe, justify a standard
vesting district courts with greater discretion in declaratory judgment actions than
that permitted under the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado River and
Moses H. Cone. No subsequent case, in our view, has called into question the
application of the Brillhart standard to the Brillhart facts.
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286.
192. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
193. Id. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Machuda Co., 360 U.S.185 (1959)).
194. Id. at 817.
195. Id. at 819-20.
196. 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
197. Id. at 718.
198. See id. The Quackenbush Court differentiated declaratory judgment actions from the
traditional powers of abstention rising in equity. Id.
199. See id. at 716-18.
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Brillhart test applies only to actions brought under the FDJA.2"0  The
Supreme Court has recognized that other types of declaratory
judgment actions, not brought under the FDJA, are not subject to the
same unique discretion that arises pursuant to the language of the
FDJA.21' As was discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Transamerica
Occidental Life Insurance Company v. Digregorio,212 "Colorado River
itself involved a complaint for declaratory relief. '213  However, the
Digregorio court went on to state:
Whatever the proper determination, it is at least clear that the
Colorado River Court did not consider that case to be a [Federal]
Declaratory Judgment Act suit. Otherwise the four dissenters in
[Will v.] Calvert [Fire Insurance Company] (all of whom were
members of the six-justice Colorado River majority) would not
have distinguished the "discretionary" federal jurisdiction over
declaratory judgment suits from the "non-discretionary" federal
jurisdiction to which Colorado River applies.204
The Supreme Court has agreed that although a declaratory
judgment action, Colorado River was not an action brought pursuant
to the FDJA.20 5
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit ignores a significant fact in
the Huth case.206 The portion of the case remanded to the state court
by the District Court in Huth was not based upon the FDJA; instead,
it was based upon the Arizona Declaratory Judgment Act.20 7  The
200. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). The Wilton Court observed:
Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on
federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the
rights of litigants. On its face, the statute provides that a court "may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration," ....
Id. See also id. at 282 (stating that "Brillhart makes clear that district courts possess discretion in
determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even
when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites.").
201. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) (stating that "[n]either Colorado
River, which upheld the dismissal of federal proceedings, nor Moses H. Cone, which did not,
dealt with actions brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act").
202. 811 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1987).
203. Id. at 1254 n.4 (citations omitted).
204. Id. (citations omitted).
205. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286.
206. Examination of both the Order of the district court and the Ninth Circuit opinion
reveals that in neither case did the court consider the fact that the portion of the case being
remanded was an action based upon the state declaratory judgment act and no assessment was
made of that statute to determine if that statute conferred the same unique discretion granted to
federal courts under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. See generally Hartford Ins. Co. of
the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip op. at 3-4 (D. Ariz. April 3, 2001);
Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2002).
207. See id.
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Ninth Circuit's holding in Huth is therefore contradictory to the basis
of the discretion the district courts have under the FDJA.28 As has
been discussed, the reason the abstention doctrine has been held to
apply to actions brought pursuant to the FDJA is that the empowering
statute grants the judiciary discretion to hear such actions.29  The
Arizona Declaratory Judgment Act, as opposed to the FDJA, is a pure
grant of jurisdiction by the state legislature, not a grant of
discretionary jurisdiction.21  The only discretion given to the courts
under the Arizona Declaratory Judgment Act exists where "such
judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."
2 11
Pursuant to Huth, the Ninth Circuit has thus expanded Brillhart
abstention to apply to state-originating declaratory judgment actions
that have been removed. 21 2  At least one other federal court has
previously rejected this approach .2 1  This case law would indicate that
a district court cannot apply the abstention doctrine to remand a state
declaratory judgment action which has been properly removed to
federal court.214
Under these circumstances, the reasoning must therefore be that
a district court will somehow acquire the same discretion over a state
declaratory judgment action that it had over the federal declaratory
judgment action so that it can implement the same standard of
discretion as is given pursuant to the language of the federal act.
However, it is well-settled that removal does not change the legal basis
of a removed action from state law to that of comparable federal law.215
A case that is removed to federal court based upon diversity
jurisdiction, even where consolidated with a federal action, is still a
208. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
209. Id.
210. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") and
AR.S. § 12-1831 ("Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed.") with 28 U.S.C. § 2201 ("In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction .....
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought.").
211. A.R.S. § 12-1836.
212. See generally Huth, 298 F.3d 800.
213. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Longwell, 735 F. Supp. 1187, 1190-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that the abstention doctrine could not be used to remand a properly removed state
declaratory judgment action back to state court).
214. See id.
215. See, e.g., Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1974); Carson
v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974); Strachan v.
Nisbet, 202 F.2d 216, 218 (7th Cir. 1953).
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distinct action based on state law and governed by state law, which, in
the Huth case, was the Arizona Declaratory Judgment Act.216 What
the Arizona District Court and Ninth Circuit clearly disregarded was
the fact that the action must fall under the FDJA in order to have
FDJA discretion over it.217 Because the Huth case involved an action
brought under state law and removed pursuant to diversity, the state
law in relation to the Arizona Declaratory Judgment Act should have
applied." 8
Further, the application of the Brilihart abstention doctrine to the
Huth case would appear to expressly cut against the purpose of the
abstention doctrine generally. As was previously stated, abstention is
a narrow doctrine and is only applied where an exception has been
carved out. 219  Up until the Huth decision rendered by the Ninth
Circuit, there was no exception that had been delineated by any court
which would have any application to the state-based portion of the
Huth case.
Speaking to the abstention doctrine generally, the Supreme Court
in Colorado River stated that abstention "was never a doctrine of
equity that a federal court should exercise its discretion to dismiss a
suit'merely because a state court could entertain it."22 In remanding
the Arizona Declaratory Judgment Action by using Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act discretion, the Huth decision resulted in
the very thing the Supreme Court has said abstention was not
designed for-exercise of discretion merely because a state could
entertain it.22'
216. See Torre v. Brickey, 278 F.3d 917, 919 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that state law applies
in diversity actions); Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522,
1527 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that where jurisdiction is based upon diversity, the law of the
forum state applies).
217. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995).
218. See Torre, 278 F.3d at 919; Quaker State Minit-Lube, 52 F.3d at 1527; Knapp, 506
F.2d at 364; Carson, 501 F.2d at 1083; Strachan, 202 F.2d at 218.
219. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (stating that "federal
courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise 'exceptional circumstances,' where
denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest .... for
example, where abstention is warranted by considerations of 'proper constitutional adjudication,'
'regard for federal-state relations,' or 'wise judicial administration') (citations omitted).
220. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813-14.
221. See id. See also Huth, 298 F.3d at 804 (recognizing that while the district court held
that the state court was the preferable forum, there was admittedly "no great need for state court
resolution" in that case).
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2. The Incredible Shrinking Pending and Parallel State Action
Element
The Huth decision also significantly expands the abstention
doctrine in a manner contrary to the limiting principle expressed in
Colorado River by extending the Brillhart reasoning to declaratory
judgment actions in which there is no pending parallel state action.222
The District Court in Huth found that despite the fact that the
Arizona declaratory judgment action had been properly removed to
federal court, that action still was a "pending" state action and could
thus be remanded pursuant to the court's discretion under the
FDJA.223 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.224
The district court explained its reasoning in a footnote in its
order.22' The court observed:
Hartford argues that there is no state court action as it has been
removed to federal court. The Court does not find this
argument persuasive. Clearly [the original state action] began in
state court. Once this court decides to remand the action the
case will proceed in state court rather than federal court.
Hartford cannot avoid the Court's jurisdictional discretion
under the FDJA by removing a state court action and then
arguing no state court action exists.226
The irony in this argument is that the logical fallacy of which the
district court accused Hartford is exactly the reasoning the district
court employs to remand the original state action. The district court
remanded the original state action based upon Brillhart discretion that
exists only where there is a pending parallel state court action.227
Accordingly, the court first had to remand in order to gain the
discretion that it exercised when remanding the case. To use the
court's reasoning, the court cannot exercise its discretion under the
FDJA by remanding a case and then arguing that a pending parallel
state action exists which gives it the right to exercise such discretion.
The holding in Huth on this issue contradicts the decisions of at
least two other circuits, an earlier decision from the Ninth Circuit
222. Compare Huth, 298 F.3d at 804 with Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813-14.
223. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip op. at 4
(D. Ariz. April 3, 2001).
224. See Huth, 298 F.3d 800.
225. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. 00-2067 & No. 00-2345, slip op. at 4
n.4 (D. Ariz. April 3, 2001).
226. Id.
227. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289-90.
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itself, and other decisions of the United States Supreme Court.228
First, in a previous published and still valid decision, the Ninth
Circuit held that a state action that has been properly removed to
federal court is not a pending state action. In Kirkbride v. Continental
Casualty Company,229 the subject case had been removed in its entirety
to federal court. 23" The district court remanded the declaratory
judgment action to state court based upon the abstention doctrine.231
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.232 The
court observed that "[t]he [abstention] doctrine is 'available only in
situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent
jurisdictions, either by the federal courts or by the state and federal
courts. ''2" Accordingly, the Kirkbride court held that the abstention
doctrine was not applicable because the entire case had been removed
to federal court and thus "there was no concurrent or pending state
court proceeding when" the motion for remand was made.234
Other jurisdictions agree with the holding of the Ninth Circuit in
Kirkbride. The court in Piekarski v. Home Owners Savings Bank, 33
found that the abstention doctrine was inapplicable because there was
only "one case, which originally was in state court, but now has been
properly removed to federal court." '23 6 Further, the Southern District
of New York, in Allstate Insurance Company v. Longwell, 37 addressed a
factual scenario almost identical to the issues presented in Huth.238 To
resolve a coverage dispute, the insurer in that case filed a declaratory
judgment action in federal court. 239  The insured then filed a
228. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800; Kirkbride v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 933 F.2d
729 (9th Cir. 1991); Piekarski v. Home Owners Say. Bank, 743 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1990);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Longwell, 735 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
229. 933 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1991).
230. Id. at 731.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 735.
233. Id. at 734. (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Nichols, 885 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
in original)).
234. Id. See also Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1357 v. Am. Int'l Adjustment Co., Inc.,
955 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 n.1 (D. Haw. 1997) (observing that there was no pending state action
where the state action had been properly removed).
235. 743 F.Supp. 38.
236. Id. at 42. See also Dittmer v. County of Suffolk, 146 F.3d 113, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1998)
(recognizing that abstention could only be applied where there was the contemporaneous exercise
of concurrent jurisdiction, which would not include where a case had been removed to federal
court).
237. 735 F. Supp. 1187.
238. In both the Huth case and the Longwell case, the insurer first filed a declaratory
judgment action in state court which was subsequently followed by the insured filing a virtually
identical state court action. The insurers both then removed the state court action to federal
court.
239. Id. at 1189.
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responsive declaratory judgment action in state court. 240 The insurer
subsequently removed the state action to federal court based upon
diversity jurisdiction. 241' The insured moved to remand the state
action back to state court.242
The court in Longwell first rejected the argument that the
abstention doctrine defined in Burford applied because the declaratory
judgment action involved only the application of contract principles
and did not interfere with specialized ongoing state regulatory
schemes.243 More significantly, the court held the argument that the
abstention doctrine as pronounced in Colorado River did not apply
under those circumstances. 244 The court stated that the doctrine given
in Colorado River is "predicated on the existence of pending state
litigation on parallel issues, and, thus, are inapposite since there is no
longer anything pending in the state courts-both lawsuits are now
here. "24
Essentially, these cases all support the conclusion that the Huth
decision is in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's holding in
Colorado River.246 Simply stated, a state action that is in federal court
cannot be in state court at the same time.247 While the action may still
be based on state law, the action, upon removal, is "pending" in
federal court.24" The effect of the decision of the district court and the
240. Id. at 1189-90.
241. Id. at 1190.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1191.
244. Id. at 1191-92.
245. Id. at 1192.
246. The Court in Colorado River recognized that even where there were pending parallel
state proceedings, the circumstances warranting the exercise of abstention was extremely limited.
424 U.S. at 817-18 (1976). The Court observed:
Generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that "the pendency of an
action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the
Federal court having jurisdiction .... " As between federal district courts, however,
though no precise rule has evolved, the general principle is to avoid duplicative
litigation. This difference in general approach between state-federal concurrent
jurisdiction and wholly federal concurrent jurisdiction stems from the virtually
unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.
Given this obligation, and the absence of weightier considerations of constitutional
adjudication and state-federal relations, the circumstances permitting the dismissal of
a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise
judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances
appropriate for abstention.
Id. (citations omitted).
247. See Kirkbride v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co,, 933 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1991);
Piekarski v. Home Owners Savings Bank, 743 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1990); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Longwell, 735 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
248. "Pending" has been defined as "[a]waiting an occurrence or conclusion of action,
period of continuance or indeterminacy. Thus, an action or suit is 'pending' from its inception
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Ninth Circuit in the Huth case is that every diversity case becomes
discretionary-even though a case has been removed to federal court,
it remains a "pending" state action. Under this reasoning, a court can
always remand a removed diversity action under abstention principles.
The Supreme Court has unequivocally rejected this conclusion.
249
In the vein of Colorado River, the holding in Brillhart only
applies where there are parallel state proceedings." Thus, in a like
manner, application of the abstention doctrine has been rejected when
there are no pending parallel state proceedings. 25' Brillhart abstention,
as was shown in Part III.A.1. above, also only applies to the FDJA.22
Accordingly, in Kirkbride, the court specifically rejected the argument
that the district court's abstention was supported by the "broader
discretion afforded to trial courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction
under the [Federal] Declaratory Judgment Act," simply because a
state declaratory judgment action was removed to federal court.2"3
Thus, the Huth decision deviates from prior decisions of other federal
jurisdictions and in the Ninth Circuit itself and extends the doctrine's
application to enable a district court to remand a case which has been
properly removed.
B. Determining the Governing Discretionary Standard for the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Action When There Are No Parallel State
Proceedings
In Wilton, the Supreme Court concluded its decision by stating
"[w]e do not attempt at this time to delineate the outer boundaries of
that discretion in other cases, for example, cases raising issues of
federal law or cases in which there are no parallel state proceedings.25 4
Both Brillhart and Wilton addressed only a situation in which a federal
until the rendition of final judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (6th ed. 1990).
Accordingly, upon removal, a case is "awaiting" its conclusion in federal court.
249. See Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 356 (1988) (stating that
diversity jurisdiction is not discretionary). See also Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326
U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) (holding that ."[t]he diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the
benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience. Its purpose was generally to afford to
suitors an opportunity in such cases, at their option, to assert their rights in the federal rather
than in the state courts."') (quoting Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234
(1943).
250. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286.
251. See Kirkbride, 933 F.2d at 734-35 (holding that while it was the long-standing rule for
the Ninth Circuit to allow the district court discretion over actions brought under the FDJA, the
rule did not apply in this case because this was not a federal declaratory action but was rather a
removed action from state court).
252. See supra Part III.A.1. and accompanying notes.
253. Kirkbride,933F.2dat734-35.
254. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added).
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declaratory judgment action is brought at the same time a parallel stateproceeding is pending. 2"5 The diverse and contradictory opinions that
result from the lack of guidance by the Supreme Court on the issue of
what, if any, discretion the district court has over a federal declaratory
judgment action under such circumstances, is illustrated and
exemplified by the Huth decision. In Huth, the district court and the
Ninth Circuit provided an answer to the question left open by Wilton.
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit in Huth applied the
Brillhart analysis in that case.256 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit panel went
so far as to state that the absence of a pending state action is simply
one of the "balancing factors the district court must weigh" as
articulated in Brillhart."7
As was shown in Part III.A.2., in other jurisdictions, as well as in
the Ninth Circuit itself, courts have agreed that there is no pending
state proceeding when a state case has been entirely removed to federal
court. 28  Likewise, many other jurisdictions, as well as the Ninth
Circuit, have all held that the Brillhart abstention principles will not
apply where there is no parallel state proceeding. 29  These holdings
are consistent with the fact that the Supreme Court has observed that
under Brillhart "district courts have substantial latitude in deciding
whether to stay or to dismiss a declaratory judgment suit in light of
pending state proceedings. ' 26" The existence of a pending state
proceeding is a prerequisite to applying the Brillhart analysis under
the Supreme Court's prior decisions.261
255. See generally Brillhart, 316 U.S. 491; Wilton, 515 U.S. 277.
256. Huth, 298 F.3d 800.
257. Id. at 802-03.
258. See Kirkbride v. Continental Cas. Co., 933 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1991); Int'l Bhd of
Elect. Workers Local 1357 v. American Int'l Adjustment Co., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 n.1
(D. Haw. 1997); Piekarski v. Home Owners Savings Bank, 743 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D.D.C. 1990);
Dittmer v. County of Suffolk, 146 F.3d 113, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1998); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Longwell, 735 F. Supp. 1187, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
259. See Kirkbride, 933 F.2d at 734-35 (rejecting the argument that the broader discretion
to abstain did not apply in a case where there was no parallel state proceeding because the state
action had been removed to federal court); Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lopez, 2000 WL
33179290 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that where there are no parallel state proceedings, the
Brillhart abstention doctrine does not apply) (citing Maryland Cas. Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284
(9th Cir. 1996)); Jafee v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 1997 WL 685347 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing
to apply the Brillhart abstention doctrine where there are no parallel state proceedings).
260. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).
261. See id. at 289-90.
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Some federal courts have reached similar holdings to the Huth
case. 262 For example, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Ind-
Com Electric Company,263 the Fourth Circuit held:
There is no requirement that a parallel proceeding be pending in
state court before a federal court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action. Rather, as the
district court stated, "[t]he existence or nonexistence of a state
court action is simply one consideration relevant to whether to
grant declaratory relief." To hold otherwise would in effect
create a per se rule requiring a district court to entertain a
declaratory judgment action when no state court proceeding is
pending. Such a rule would be inconsistent with our long-
standing belief that district courts should be afforded great
latitude in determining whether to grant or deny declaratory
relief.
2 64
The basis of the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit reflects the
breadth to which the courts are taking the application of Brillhart
abstention. Essentially, rather than seeing the need to exercise their
"virtually unflagging obligation," the courts in Huth and Ind-Com are
finding a way to avoid the exercise of such discretion in all
circumstances.
C. Reason in the "Balance"-Abstention Despite Neutral Brillhart
Factors
As has been reiterated, it is recognized that the district courts
have been granted discretion in entertaining actions under the
FDJA.265 However, this discretion is to be guided by the principles
outlined in Brillhart.266 While the Brillhart court did not set forth an
exclusive set of factors to be used for applying abstention to a federal
declaratory judgment action, the Ninth Circuit has derived three
primary factors from the Brillhart decision the district court is to
avoid: (1) needless determination of state law issues; (2) declaratory
262. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419 (4th Cir.
1998); Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Marchall v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 184
F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Kan. 2001).
263. 139 F.3d 419 (4th Cir. 1998).
264. Id. at 423 (citations omitted).
265. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286 (stating that "[slince its inception, the Declaratory
Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion
in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.").
266. See id. at 289-90.
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actions filed as a means of forum shopping; and, (3) duplicative
litigation.267
In the Huth decision, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court that the duplicative litigation and forum shopping factors were
both neutral.268 In addressing the factor related to state law issues, the
Ninth Circuit admitted that there was no great need for state court
resolution in this case. 269 Essentially, the Ninth Circuit believed that
all of the three Brillhart factors were neutral; however, the Ninth
Circuit concluded in Huth that unless there was a presumption in
favor of retaining jurisdiction, the district court could exercise its
discretion to decline jurisdiction.27 °
It is clear that the factors set forth in Brillhart are not exhaustive.
Even though the Ninth Circuit in Huth recognized this principle, it
apparently did not see the need in finding any other factor which
would weigh in favor of abstaining from exercising jurisdiction. The
effect of this reasoning is that, as long as the district court analyzes the
factors of Brillhart, the district court can abstain even where the
factors weighed are neutral. Such a decision would leave the courts
without any guidance on the discretion in abstaining from exercising
their jurisdiction in these types of cases, abrogating the effect of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Brillhart and Wilton. Currently, the
federal courts are left divided and without coherent standards for
exercising their discretion under the FDJA and reviewing courts will
have no standard by which to review the district courts for abuse of
discretion.
This standard, or lack thereof, directly contradicts the "spirit of
the law" as set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Government Employees
Insurance Company v. Dizol.271 The Ninth Circuit has held that
examination of the district court must create a "sufficient record of its
reasoning to enable appropriate appellate review."2"2 Without such a
record, the appellate courts would not be able to provide the district
courts with "appropriate guidance." '273 The Ninth Circuit in Huth,
while effectively finding that all the factors analyzed by the court were
neutral, found this a sufficient recording of the district court's
267. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225; Continental Cas. Co.
v. Robsac Ind., 947 F.2d 1367, 1371-73 (9th Cir. 1991).
268. Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2002).
269. Id. at 804.
270. Id.
271. 133 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998).
272. Id. at 1225.
273. Id. (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995)).
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analysis.27 4 Where analysis of the factors reaches a neutral result, and
that is all that exists in the record, the actual reasoning of the court is
not recorded at all. Without such a record, the court's reasoning may
be based on "whim or personal disinclination. "275 It is for this reason
that the Supreme Court has recognized that the district court's
decision to abstain from jurisdiction cannot rest on a mechanical
checklist of factors, but must rest "on a careful balancing of the
important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance
heavily weighed in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. "276
Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Huth, therefore, where the
Brilihart factors are totally neutral, the district court may then use its
unfettered, unguided discretion to deprive a party of the federal forum
it has selected based on the whim of the District Court judge. Both
the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have confirmed that such
discretion is unacceptable. 77  The Huth decision exalts form over
substance, merely paying lip service to the Supreme Court's
requirements that the discretion of the District Court be guided by
some standard, broad though it may be.
D. Taking Another Look at the Application of the Ninth Circuit
Brillhart Factors in the Factual Circumstances of Huth
1. "Forum Shopping"
The application of the Brillhart factors in Huth also reveals the
direction that the reasoning of this decision will take the federal courts.
Initially it can be observed that in Huth, the Ninth Circuit's holding in
relation to the "forum shopping" factor is in contradiction to the
previously established law in the Ninth Circuit, other federal
jurisdictions, and the United States Supreme Court."7 Huth claimed
under Wilton that it was of no significance which case (the state case
274. Huth, 298 F.3d at 803 (stating that "[iln its Order, the district court stated its
reasoning under each Brillhart factor in satisfaction of the requirement that the court make a
record of its reasoning sufficient to allow review.").
275. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Public Affairs Associates. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111,
112 (1962)).
276. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1983).
Stated differently, a district court's task "is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction." Id. at 25.
277. See Huth, 298 F.3d at 803; Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Public Affairs Associates.
v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962)).
278. See United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001);
Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 105
F.3d 514, 515-516 (9th Cir. 1997); United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 494 (4th
Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 27:751
2004] Expanding Judicial Abstention
or the federal case) was filed first and perhaps under facts similar to
those found in Wilton that may have been true.279 However, applying
that rule to the facts in Huth would only support the parties' ability to
engage in forum shopping.
First, Hartford did not engage in "forum shopping" as
contemplated in Brillhart by removing the Arizona declaratory action
to federal court. Forum shopping is generally defined as occurring
"when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or
jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment
or verdict. '28" This occurs every time a suit is filed;28 1 however, this is
not the "forum shopping" addressed in the Brillhart factors.28 2 The
forum shopping contemplated under Brilihart is the avoidance of
abusive, "reactive" declaratory judgment actions."' In Chamberlain v.
Allstate Insurance Company,284 the Ninth Circuit stated that the forum
shopping factor of Brillhart was based upon the "concern that parties
279. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
280. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990). See also Mary Garvey Algero, In
Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80 (1999)
(stating that "attorneys filing lawsuits or defending against lawsuits usually have the same
objective when it comes to evaluating or seeking a venue-they seek a venue in which their
clients can not only get a fair trial, but in which their clients might gain some advantage or begin
with the odds in their favor.").
281. See Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2003)
(stating that "[t]he filing of every lawsuit requires forum selection."). See also Note, Forum
Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1990) (observing that "[f]orum selection
is always a part of the legal process; at no clear point does it become forum 'shopping."').
282. See Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367 (observing that the Brillhart decision expressed a
"concern that parties could attempt to avoid state court proceedings by filing declaratory relief
actions in federal court. This kind of forum shopping could be avoided by requiring district
courts to inquire into the availability of state court proceedings to resolve all issues without
federal intervention.").
283. See id. In Shenvin- Williams, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discusses this issue at
length, stating:
Although many federal courts use terms such as "forum selection" and "anticipatory
filing" to describe reasons for dismissing a federal declaratory judgment action in
favor of related state court litigation, these terms are shorthand for more complex
inquiries. The filing of every lawsuit requires forum selection. Federal declaratory
judgment suits are routinely filed in anticipation of other litigation. The courts use
pejorative terms such as "forum shopping" or "procedural fencing" to identify a
narrower category of federal declaratory judgment lawsuits filed for reasons found
improper and abusive, other than selecting a forum or anticipating related litigation.
Merely filing a declaratory judgment action in a federal court with jurisdiction to hear
it, in anticipation of state court litigation, is not in itself improper anticipatory
litigation or otherwise abusive "forum shopping."
343 F.3d at 391.
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that
in relation to the Brillhart factors, "federal courts should generally decline to entertain reactive
declaratory actions.").
284. 931 F.2d at 1367.
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could attempt to avoid state court proceedings by filing declaratory
relief action in federal court. ' 285 Hartford's action in federal court was
filed prior to the Huth state action and therefore could not have been
filed to avoid an impending adverse ruling in state court.286 Further,
removal of the state action to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction is not forum shopping as contemplated by Brillhart.287
According to this case law in the Huth case, Hartford cannot be said to
have engaged in forum shopping by initially filing an action in federal
court and then removing the state action to federal court.
Second, the still valid case law of the Ninth Circuit indicates that
Huth did engage in "forum shopping" as contemplated in Brillhart by
filing the Arizona declaratory judgment action. The Ninth Circuit
later expanded the statement made in Chamberlain to encompass a
reverse scenario.288 The Ninth Circuit declared in relation to an
insured filing a state action in an attempt to avoid federal jurisdiction:
As we have explained, district courts "should discourage
litigants from filing declaratory judgment actions as a means of
forum shopping." ... While the circumstances here are perhaps
different than those anticipated when those words were first
written, we nonetheless find the principle to be a sound one as
applied in this context. Forum shopping through the filing of
declaratory judgment actions is no more appropriate when it
favors state over federal jurisdiction than when it favors the
reverse.
289
The implications of this ruling are that if it is forum shopping for
an insurer to file a reactive declaratory judgment action in federal
court when there is a pending state court action, it is also forum
shopping when an insured files a reactive declaratory judgment action
in state court declaratory judgment action when there is a pending
federal counterclaim.
Thus, according to the established law in the Ninth Circuit,
Hartford's act of filing a proper case in federal court, when no state
action was pending, and when no non-removable state law claims
appear to have been anticipated, could not be said to be forum
285. Id.
286. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 105 F.3d 514, 515-516 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by retaining jurisdiction when there was no
parallel proceeding in state court when the Federal Declaratory Judgment action was
commenced); United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that carrier did not engage in forum shopping by filing its declaratory judgment action in Federal
court before the insured filed its action in state court).
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982).
288. See United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2001).
289. Id. at 1114-15.
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shopping. 2" However, according to the Ninth Circuit's holding in
R&D Latex, Huth's filing of a reactive, identical declaratory claim in
state court is forum shopping.291  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit in
affirming the finding that the forum shopping factor did not weigh in
favor of either party would leave a district court without guidance to
appropriately apply this factor, essentially allowing the courts the
unfettered discretion to use it in whatever way that allows for
abstention.
2. "Duplicative Litigation"
Again, the Ninth Circuit decision in Huth made the application
of this factor as broad as possible. The Huth court held that this factor
was neutral because "[t]he case will be disposed of entirely either in
state or federal court, depending upon the outcome of this appeal. 
292
This does not accurately represent the nature or basis of this factor.
The basis for this factor, as previously articulated by the Ninth
Circuit, is that the Brillhart "court no doubt wanted to avoid
duplicitous litigation. As the [Brillhart] court noted, '[g]ratuitous
interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state
court litigation should be avoided.'
293
Essentially, this Brillhart factor focused on federal interference
with ongoing state litigation.294 If that principle were applied to the
facts as they existed in the Huth case, it is clear that there was no
opportunity for interference with ongoing state court proceedings29
because the state court action had been removed to federal court.29
Because there was no opportunity for "duplicative litigation" by
retaining jurisdiction over the case, it should have weighed in favor of
exercising jurisdiction. Therefore, the reasoning used by the Huth
court has the effect of broadening Brilihart abstention by turning the
"duplicative litigation" factor into simply a concern of whether the
case can be fully resolved in the state forum.
3. "Needless Determination of State Law"
Finally, the Ninth Circuit panel's decision, with regard to the
holding on the "needless determination of state law" factor, also
broadens the application of Brillhart abstention as it was contradictory
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. Huth, 298 F.3d at 803-04.
293. Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991).
294. See id.
295. See supra Part III.A.2. and accompanying notes.
296. Huth, 298 F.3d at 802.
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to the established law in the Ninth Circuit and in the United States
Supreme Court.297 The Ninth Circuit in Huth observed that there was
no great need for a determination to be made in state court.
298
However, because there was no presumption favoring retaining
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that was based on the fact that it was solely a state law issue. 29 9 This is
not, nor has it ever been, the proper standard for application of this
factor. °° The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit itself have always
required more to weigh in favor of abstention.30 '
According to Brillhart and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Chamberlain, this factor supports abstention only where there is a
pending state proceeding and the state law issues are complex.3 2 The
Ninth Circuit in Chamberlain stated the following as the basis for this
factor:
The Court [in Brillhart] recognized the difficulty federal district
courts would have in ruling on complex state law issues when it
warned that "scattered opinions of an intermediate appellate
court of a State may convey only doubts and confusion to one
inexpert in the law of that State and yet be entirely clear and
consistent when placed in the mosaic of the whole law of that
State. "303
The legal issues in the Huth case were not complex, and did not
require the district court to "find [their] way through a maze of local
statutes and decisions on so technical and specialized a subject . "..."304
Instead, as the panel recognized, there was no great need for a
determination of the state law in the case.305
Further, as has previously been discussed, there was no pending
state proceeding in Huth.3 °6 The language of the decision of the Ninth
Circuit accepts the possibility that Hartford was correct in its assertion
297. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367.
298. Huth, 298 F.3d at 804.
299. Id.
300. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367. See also Shapiro, supra
note 2, at 587 (observing that "a wholesale refusal by the federal courts to adjudicate diversity
cases on the grounds that these courts have more important things to do, and that the state courts
are more appropriate tribunals, simply cannot be reconciled with the congressional grant of
authority, no matter how much appeal this approach may have for particular judges.").
301. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367.
302. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367.
303. Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367 (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497).
304. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497.
305. Huth, 298 F.3d at 804. See United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 494
(4th Cir. 1998) (when standard state law issues are in question, a Federal court can "just as
efficiently decide" the matter as a state court can).
306. See supra Part III.B.
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that there was no pending state court action because it had been
removed." 7 While the Ninth Circuit stated that this fact does not
preclude a district court from declining jurisdiction, it should have had
the affect of nullifying this factor of Brillhart in the Huth case.3"' Even
if the existence of a pending state action were only a factor in the
balancing test, genuine application of this factor would reveal that
where there is no state action in which the state law issue can be
resolved, it cannot logically be asserted that a determination by the
District Court is "needless." Accordingly, of those courts that agree
that the non-existence of a pending state action is simply one factor of
the district court's discretionary analysis under Brillhart, all have held
that this factor weighs in favor of retaining jurisdiction over the federal
309)action.
Further, as more fully discussed above, the original state action
in Huth should not have been remanded to state court under the
abstention doctrine. 31°  A proper understanding of the law on that
issue requires the conclusion that the district court erred. Because the
district court was bound to rule on exactly the same state law issues in
the state based portion of the action, the district court could not say
that the determination of state law was "needless"'1
The affect of the decision by the panel in Huth creates a de facto
presumption of declining jurisdiction in concurrent jurisdiction
actions. Applying the standard that, as a general rule, the mere
existence of a state law issue favors abstention, federal courts will be
divested of jurisdiction in most concurrent jurisdiction actions because
cases in federal court by way of diversity of citizenship most often rest
on the application of state law.312 Instead, the true standard for this
307. Huth, 298 F.3d at 802-03.
308. See id.
309. See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 1998)
(stating that "[c]learly, the existence of such a proceeding should be a significant factor in the
district court's determination."). See also Wells' Dairy, Inc. v. Estate of Richardson, 89 F. Supp.
2d 1042, 1058 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (observing that "abstention is disfavored in cases where the
state court action is not truly parallel or where there issues of federal law control."); Epling v.
Golden Eagle/Satellite Archery, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 207, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that
"abstention is disfavored in cases where the state court action is not truly parallel or where issues
of federal law control."); Malbrough v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1996 WL 517702, 1* (E.D.
La. 1996) (observing that "[a] district court's interest in maintaining a declaratory judgment
action grows in cases involving federal law or cases in which there are no parallel state
proceedings.").
310. See supra Part IIIA.1.
311. See id.
312. See Torre v. Brickey, 278 F.3d 917, 919 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that state law applies
in diversity actions); Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522,
1527 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that where jurisdiction is based upon diversity, the law of the
forum state applies); Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1974);
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factor must be whether the action involves determination of a unique
state law, rather than whether the action simply involves the straight
application of a state law.313 Under a unique state law standard, the
lack of a complex issue of a state law thus weighs in favor of retaining
federal jurisdiction. 14  The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Huth,
however, would significantly expand the ability of the district court to
apply Brilihart abstention in contravention to both the decisions by
the Supreme Court and other decisions in the Ninth Circuit on this
issue.315
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal courts have continued to promulgate comity and
federalism as the basis for the exercise of abstention, and the Huth
decision is no different. However, in purporting to maintain a safe
and proper balance between state and federal sovereignty, the Ninth
Circuit has taken a useful tool out of the hands of litigants. Under
Huth, the creation of the right of action pursuant to the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act has been rendered meaningless, and the
long-standing right to remove a state action to federal court, at least in
the declaratory judgment context, becomes a hollow and irrelevant
device.
The ultimate result in the Ninth Circuit, and potentially in all
federal jurisdictions, is that federal judges have no restraint on the
exercise of their discretion. Rather than having to perform a balancing
test, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Brilihart, district courts
must only perform a cursory examination of a predetermined
checklist. As long as the court goes through the motion of at least
looking at the factors, they are never faced with the compulsion of
accepting jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action, regardless of
whether there is a pending state court action.
The development of federal case law reveals that, over time, the
federal judiciary has been unilaterally narrowing the boundaries of the
jurisdiction granted to them by Congress. The Huth decision in the
Ninth Circuit is simply the next giant step in this process. With this
implosion of federal jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit, we may be
seeing the beginning of a "domino effect" across the country. The
consequence is that rather than being subject to the requirement of
Carson v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce Trust and Savings, 501 F.2d 1082, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974);
Strachan v. Nisbet, 202 F.2d 216, 218 (7th Cir. 1953).
313. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367.
314. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367.
315. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497; Chamberlain, 931 F.2d at 1367.
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exercising their "virtually unflagging obligation" to accept
jurisdiction, the federal courts have been given license to exercise their
"virtually unflagging opportunity" to avoid it.
